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ABSTRACT 
Traffic crashes result in thousands of fatalities and billions of dollars in 
losses annually, and constitute a leading public health and safety problem. 
Society has responded to this problem by spending large sums of money 
and employing many people in traffic-safety programs; however, these 
ef for t s  have been unguided by any well-developed body of theory. 
Prevai1,ing highway safety theory has focused on the crash event itself, to 
the exclusion of more remote but nonetheless important factors that lead 
to traffic crashes. 
More effective management of the social risks posed by traffic crashes 
requires development of a body of theory that accounts for the role of 
society and its systems in managing social risks such as traffic crashes. A 
conceptual framework applying societal risk-management systems to the 
disutilities produced by the Highway Transportation System is presented. 
The co~nceptual framework applies concepts drawn from the disciplines of 
systems analysis and risk management. It is presented to describe the 
highway safety process and to provide the basis for further development of 
highway safety theory. Strategies for further research in highway safety 
based on the conceptual framework are described, and directions for 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper grew out of an inquiry into the conceptual tools that have 
been taed to guide highway safety efforts. During this inquiry it became 
apparent that there exists a considerable amount of literature dealing with 
micro- frameworks  of highway safety--that is, conceptual frameworks 
oriented to limited and highly specialized problems, such as mathematical 
/ 
models of vehicle dynamics. On the other hand, there is no well-developed 
body of literature dealing with the meta-frameworks of highway safety as 
a whole. Meta-fram eworks are comprehensive frameworks developed to 
explain the overall phenomenon of traffic crashes and associated losses, 
and usled to support efforts to reduce both crashes and crash losses. 
This is not to suggest that the field of highway safety is without meta- 
framelnrorks; broad frameworks exist and are in wide use. What the field 
of highway safety lacks is systematic discussion of the need for such 
meta-lframeworks, careful review of existing frameworks, and well- 
developed proposals for further conceptual development. 
The lack of well-developed literature dealing with the meta-frameworks 
used to guide highway safety efforts is a matter of serious concern. It 
implies that large-scale programs of action and research are set in motion 
without: benefit of systematic study, and without proper means to guide 
and assess that effort. In view of the significant human and economic 
resources involved, and the acknowledged role that conceptual development 
plays in any complex field, efforts to correct these deficiencies deserve a 
high priority. 
This: paper takes a modest step in that direction. It examines the need 
for a viell-developed meta-framework in the field of traffic safety; reviews 
general concepts and meta-frameworks developed in the past to explain 
traffic crashes and to support efforts to deal with them; presents a new 
framework for ordering present knowledge and suggesting directions for 
future 'action; and describes applications of the proposed framework as well 
as recommendations for public policy that flow from its use. 
TRAFFIC CRASHES: HOW SERIOUS A PROBLEM? 
Measured in absolute terms, t raff ic  crashes and associated losses 
present a social problem of great magnitude. During 1979, the most 
recent year for which complete data are available, there occurred some 
18.1 million traffic crashes, in which 51,900 persons were killed and 
another 2 million persons suffered disabling injuries. By one estimate, 
traffic crashes generate a total annual cost to society of $35.8 billion, a 
figure that includes property damage, loss of wages, medical expenses, and 
insurance costs (National Safety Council 1980). Because traffic crashes 
range from the minor tlfender-benderlt to multi-vehicle crashes in which 
many casualties occur, no single statistic adequately represents the overall 
risk, or problem, that traffic crashes present to members of society. The 
term "risktt often denotes the traffic-crash problem. More precisely, 
though, risk means the probability that an undesired event, or hazard, will 
occur. Risk thus has several different measures: what hazards are of 
interest; what persons are exposed to the hazard (that is, what is the 
population a t  risk); what are the conditions under which the exposure 
occurs; how long the population a t  risk is exposed to the hazard. 
The closest approximation of a global measure of "traffic crash riskv 
can be obtained by treating the crash itself as the hazard, and by treating 
the entire population of the United States as the population at  risk. From 
the total number of crashes that occurred in 1979 (18.1 million), and the 
estimated U.S. population for that year-in round figures, 220 million (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1979)--the so-called hazard r a t e  can* be 
determined. Hazard rate is the probability that a member of the 
population a t  risk will be involved in a specific undesired event during a 
certain period of exposure to it. Here, the event is a traffic crash, and 
the period of exposure is one year. However, not all traffic crashes are 
single-vehicle crashes; clinical studies indicate that the average crash 
involves about two persons, including passengers and pedestrians. Thus the 
number of crash involvements is approximately twice the reported number 
of crashes, or about 36.2 million per year. Thus the traffic crash hazard 
rate for 1979 for a typical U.S. resident was 36.2 million divided by 220 
million, or .165-a one-in-six chance. This in a sense represents the annual 
risk of being involved in a traffic crash during 1979. Of course, that risk 
would differ if the time period were specified differently, such as 
December 1979 or Christmas Day 1979. 
Experiencing a hazard becomes more likely as one is exposed for a 
longer time to the hazard. Assuming that the annual hazard rate for a 
traffic crash remains constant at ,165, and that the annual lifespan of the 
typical. American is 75 years, the risk of being involved in at least one 
crash during that time approaches certainty, and the expected number of 
crashes during one's lifetime becomes approximately twelve. These hazard 
rates are comparatively high, since most t r a f f i c  crashes involve 
nondisabling injuries, or property damage without injuries. For the more 
serious crashes, the hazard rates are much smaller but nonetheless 
significant. During 1979 the hazard rate for disabling injury was ,009 (2 
million divided by 220 million), and the hazard rate for death was ,0002 
(5 1,90 0 divided by 220 million). Again assuming constant annual hazard 
rates and a 75-year lifespan, the average American faces a 50  percent 
probabiility of suffering a traffic-related disabling injury and a two percent 
probabi~lity of being killed in a crash. 
Again, these figures represent oversimplified, global estimates of traffic 
crash risk for the entire population of the United States. Subpopulations 
will have varying risks. Persons who do not drive and do not ride in 
motor vehicles (for example, prisoners or hospitalized persons) have hazard 
rates approaching zero. On the other hand, male drivers aged 15 to 24 
years have a fatal crash hazard rate three times that of the general 
population, and outranking all other causes of death combined (National 
Safety Council 1980). Drivers with severe drinking problems likewise have 
higher crash risks than the population as a whole (Jones and Joscelyn 
1979). 
Traffic Crash Risk Compared to Other Risks 
The hazard most consistently used as the basis for comparing different 
kinds of risk is loss of life. Its selection no doubt reflects the difficulties 
of finding a common denominator for the many kinds of undesired events 
that can afflict humans. 
For 1977,  the most recent year for which data are available, the 
overall death rate for the United States was about ,0088. That was the 
annual hazard rate for deaths from all causes (National Center for Health 
Statistics 1980). Heart disease was the largest single cause of death for 
the population as a whole, accounting for more than a third of all deaths; 
it was followed by cancer and stroke. Accidents of all kinds ranked 
fourth, ahead of such well-publicized causes of death as pneumonia, 
diabetes, cirrhosis of the liver, arteriosclerosis, suicide, and homicide (see 
Figure 1). Among accidents, traffic crashes were by far the largest single 
cause of accidental death, accounting for about as many deaths as all 
other accidents combined (see Figure 2). 
Not all traffic crashes kill, but even nonfatal crashes are enormously 
costly to society. Hartunian, Smart, and Thompson (1980) sought to 
determine how serious a public health problem is posed by traffic crashes. 
To measure more realistically the benefits and costs of preventive 
measures against the costs of the crash problem, they treated the costs of 
crashes as if they all occurred during the "year of inciden~e,~' that is, the 
year in which the traffic crash occurred. The authors applied this same 
analysis to three other major killers: heart disease, cancer, and stroke. 
Even though there are fewer traffic casualties than cases of other, 
llnaturallt illnesses, this is balanced by the earlier incidence of crashes (that 
is, more young people experience them) and the greater likelihood that a 
crash victim will be disabled. Thus the costs of traffic crashes-including 
lost earnings, treatment costs, insurance, and legal expenses-ranked second 
behind those of cancer, and ahead of heart disease and stroke. 
While traffic crashes present a significant risk of death or serious 
injury to the general population, they account for an even larger portion of 
the death rate among adolescents and young adults, especially among 

FIGURE 2 
LEADING CAUSES OF ACCIDENTAL DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES, 1977 
(Numbers Shown a r e  Death Rates pe r  Year per  Member of t h e  General Population) 
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males. The motor vehicle death rate for persons aged 15 to 24 is twice 
that of persons of all ages and, as already mentioned, the death rate for 
males in that age group is even larger. Traffic crashes are the leading 
killers of persons aged 15  to 24. They account for 38 percent of all 
fatalities, and persist as the leading cause of death until about age 35, 
when cancer surpasses it (National Center for Health Statistics 1980). The 
prevalence of traffic deaths and injuries among younger persons is 
especially significant in terms of long-term rehabilitation for the disabled, 
and the loss of huge amounts of potential earnings by those who are killed 
or incapacitated. 
As noted earlier, risk is the probability that a given hazard will occur. 
Risk is directly related to exposure, and that exposure is not the same 
throughout the population. Some members of the population spend more 
time in vehicles than others, and some more frequently operate vehicles 
under condi tions--such as intoxication or f atigue-that make a crash more 
likely. That being the case, it is preferable to specify more clearly the 
conditions under which exposure to hazard occurs. The term conditional 
risk is used to denote the probability that an event will occur given one 
or more conditions. A specified condition might be driving in excess of 
the speed limit; being less than 18 years old; or having a blood alcohol 
concentration higher than the legal limit. 
Starr (1969) developed order-of-magnitude estimates of the conditional 
hazard rate-the probability that a specified hazard, a fatality, will occur 
during a given period of exposure to the hazard-associated with a number 
of deadly activities, including vehicular travel. He found that general 
aviation presented the greatest conditional risk, with a hazard rate of 
about ,00003 fatalities per hour of exposure. This was about thirty times 
the hazard rate of automobile travel which, in turn, was about fifty times 
that of railroad travel and about 10,000 times that of natural disasters 
(see Figure 3). On the basis of conditional hazard rates, one hour of 
automobile travel was estimated to be only slightly less risky to life than 
one hour on a military assignment in Vietnam. Starr's figures should be 
qualified, however, in that the average person is exposed to traffic crashes 
FIGURE 3 
ESTIMATED CONDITIONAL HAZARD RATES 
ASSOCIATED WITH DEATH DUE TO SELECTED CAUSES, CIRCA 1969 
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only for an hour or two per day, as opposed to around-the-clock exDosure 
for a combat soldier or in the case of natural disasters. Still, Starrls 
findings show that traffic crashes present a significant risk to members of 
society, and they are sufficiently large to expect an allocation of resources 
commc!nsurate with other risks. This, however, has not been the case. 
Consider that the death rate due to traffic crashes is about eight times 
that due to fires (National Center for Health Statistics 1980). nJost 
communities, though, have fire departments funded and staffed at a level 
nearly equal to police departments. Consider also the relative problem of 
crime versus traffic crashes. The police, who deal with traffic control, 
are  also responsible for preventing crime and performing community 
services. In recent years, public perception of the dangers of violent 
crime has resulted in the diversion of police resources away from traffic 
duty and toward general law enforcement. Igleberger (1969) reported that 
the Dayton, Ohio police department reviewed its priorities, basing the 
review in large part on perceived citizen needs as reflected in requests for 
service and complaints; as a result, the department reduced the manpower 
allocation to traffic control. The citizens of Dayton perceived crime to 
be a miore important social problem than traffic crashes. Their perception 
of social problems probably cannot be disputed; the accuracy of that 
perception is more debatable. 
Helller and VcEwen (1973) conducted a study in St. Louis, Missouri, 
designed to improve the allocation of police resources. The researchers 
examined a series of crimes and rated their seriousness based on criteria 
such as whether the victim was injured, whether a weapon was used, and 
how much property loss occurred, They then used the same set of criteria 
to rate the seriousness of traffic crashes. Even though most traffic 
crashe:; lack one component of crime, intimidation, the injuries and 
property losses in crashes were serious enough that the average traffic 
crash vvas 50 percent more serious than the average serious crime. The 
Heller and McEwen study, while not definitive, strongly suggests the 
inaccuracy of society's perception of the relative, aggregate risk of crime 
and traffic crashes. 
The data show that the problem of traffic crashes is great, in absolute 
terms, and that it is also serious when compared with other public health 
and safety risks. The relative importance of traffic crashes as a societal 
risk, given present public perceptions, is apparently not well understood. 
This suggests that the relative risk of traffic crashes must be better 
defined and communicated so that more accurate public perceptions can be 
developed. So long as society perceives the risk of traffic crashes as less 
important than other risks, society's efforts to control those risks will be 
limited. 
WHAT CAUSES TRAFFIC CRASHES? 
To reduce the risk of traffic crashes and associated losses, it is 
necessary to know what causes traffic crashes. The state of the art of 
knowledge about injury-producing mechanisms and the dynamics of the 
crash phase are advanced relative to knowledge about crash causation; yet, 
not enough is known about either area. It is nonetheless important to 
have some measure of understanding about what causes crashes, since 
efforts to solve the traffic crash problem are highly influenced by 
perceptions about how and why crashes occur. 
Human, Vehicular, and Environmental Factors 
Treat et al. (1977)  reported the findings of a study on traffic crash 
causation conducted by the Indiana University Ins ti tut e for Research in  
Public Safety. That study occurred in Monroe County, Indiana, over a 
period of more than five years. The general objective was to satisfy 
national needs for data regarding crash causation and crash avoidance. 
Data were collected on three levels of detail, as shown in Figure 4. At 
level A ,  police reports of crashes, driver license data, and vehicle 
registration data were collected. At level B, technicians were sent to 
FIGURE 4 
LEVELS OF D E T A I L  I N  THE DATA COLLECTED 
I N  THE INDIANA T R I - L E V E L  STUDY 
SURVEY 
SOURCE: T r e a t  e t  a l .  (1977) 
crash scenes shortly af ter  crashes occurred, and they conducted an 
independent, on-the-scene evaluation. Level C investigations were 
conducted after the crashes; these involved a multidisciplinary team of 
professionals. At level C, quantitative measurements were made, the 
crashed vehicles were physically examined by automotive engineers, 
involved drivers received vision and knowledge tests, and accident  
reconstruction specialists made drawings of the scene and assisted in 
obtaining and interpreting physical evidence. Following the data collection 
process, the multidisciplinary team convened as a group to develop a 
clinical assessment of the causes of the crash. 
Causative factors were listed in three primary categories: human, 
environmental, and vehicular, The classes of causal factors were not 
mutually exclusive; i t  was possible for two or more factors to play a 
causative role in a crash. 
A rating system was developed to express the investigatorsf degree of 
confidence in their conclusions that a factor played a role in the crash: 
"certain," when there was no doubt; ffprobable,fl when it was highly likely 
although not certain; and "possible,f1 when p~tentially relevant although the 
evidence did not substantially support its existence or involvement. Failure 
to assign even a "possibleff rating to a factor reflected a judgment that its 
involvement was highly unlikely. 
The findings of Treat and associates are presented in overview form in 
Figure 5, Among the major classes of causative factors, human factors 
played a t  least a probable role in as many as 93 percent of all traffic 
crashes, environmental factors in up to 34 percent, and vehicular factors in 
up to 13  percent. Among specific human factors examined by Treat and 
associates, improper lookout ranked first; it was at  least a probable factor 
in 2 3  percent of all crashes involving a human causative factor. Other 
frequent human factors included excessive speed (17 percent), inattention 
(15 percent), and improper evasive action (13 percent). 
Caution should be taken in interpreting the crash causation data. 
Although human factors were found to be the predominant class of 
causative factors, it is not correct to assume from this finding that the 
HUMAN ENVIRONMENTAL VEHICULAR 
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only response to a human failure should be directed at the driver. Some 
underlying conditions that lead to human failure may be addressed more 
effectively by modifying the vehicle, the roadway environment, or both. 
On the other hand, most of the vehicular factors noted were maintenance- 
related rat  her than manufacturing defects; thus the best way to address 
some vehicle defects would be to direct responses a t  the owner or 
operator. 
The findings reported here are the product of a relatively large study 
and reflect perhaps the best available information regarding crash 
causatiLon. Still, they are not definitive. They should not be extrapolated 
to the entire United States and should not be used to support general 
statements such as a conclusion that "93 percent of traffic crashes are 
caused by human failures." The data reported by Treat and associates, 
however, are remarkably consistent with other, more limited studies in the 
United States and in other countries as well. The studies indicate that 
human factors take precedence among the causes of traffic crashes. 
The relative involvement rates of human, vehicular, or environmental 
fac tor ,  should be kept in mind as general trends when developing, 
implementing, and assessing strategies to control crash losses. 
Human Causes: Unsafe Driving Acts 
Prior study of traffic crash causation has consisted of statistical 
assesslments that seek to determine if a factor is overrepresented in the 
crashed population as opposed to a comparable noncrashed population; and 
clinic,al investigations that examine individual crashes to determine the 
factors that led to their occurrence. Data obtained from clinical studies 
are useful because they permit estimates of the relative involvement of 
various crash-producing factors. Clinical studies include the Indiana 
University Tri-Level Study reported by Treat et al. (1977); similar studies 
conducted in England (Sabey and Staughton 1975); and examinations of 
unsafe driving actions conducted at  the University of North Carolina 
(Lohman et al. 1976; Hiett et al. 1975) and at The University of Michigan 
(Treat e t  al. 1980). In many cases the various clinical studies point to 
roughly the same involvement by selected factors in crashes. 
Human factors were found by Treat and associates (1977)  to be the 
predominant cause of crashes; they are at least potential causal factors in 
as many as 93 percent of all crashes. With respect to human factors, the 
various studies have provided a relatively consistent picture of the driving 
actions and errors that cause crashes. Three principal classes of driver 
behavior predominate: intentional risk-taking behavior (especially excessive 
speed); delays in perception resulting from inattention or distraction; and 
inadequate search and detection activity before entering or crossing the 
flow of traffic. These broad categories may sometimes overlap; for 
example, failure to search and detect, or even excessive speed, may be the 
result of preoccupation. On the other hand, delays in perception may be 
caused by impairment. Using a somewhat more specific classification of 
human factors, Treat and associates found that improper lookout was the 
most frequent human error; it appeared in 23 percent of the crashes in 
which human factors played a causal role. Excessive speed is the next 
most frequent error, followed by inattention, improper evasive action, 
internal distraction, improper driving technique, and inadequately defensive 
driving technique (Treat 1980). This taxonomy, however, does not readily 
translate into measurable and observable driving behaviors. Most efforts to 
reduce the incidence of behaviors that increase the risk of a crash depend 
upon externally observing and measuring the behaviors. This is especially 
t rue  when effor ts  to reduce unsafe driving take the form of law 
enforcement strategies. 
One behavior that is both observable and measurable, and is frequently 
implicated in traffic crashes, is speeding. Excessive speed-both in excess 
of posted limits and too fast for conditions-is one of the leading crash- 
causing behaviors, accounting for approximately twenty percent of crashes 
of all severities and a considerably higher percentage of fatal and other 
serious crashes. Inappropriate speed selection also includes driving too 
slow, which may account for another ten percent of traffic crashes (Treat 
et al. 1980). The North Carolina study (Lohman et al. 1976) identified two 
other unsafe actions-following too closely and driving left of center--that 
are nlot only leading causes of traffic crashes but capable of external 
observation. However, subsequent clinical analysis shows that while left- 
of-center driving appears to  be causally involved in ten percent of all 
crashes and an even higher percentage of f a t a l i t i e s ,  i t  is e i ther  
uninte~~tional or is prompted by a decision to avoid an obstacle in the road 
(such as a jogger or a pothole) and most of the remaining actions are the 
product of fatigue or impairment and thus not conscious and deliberate. 
Following too closely is believed to be the cause of 1 4  percent of all 
crashes, if a broad definition of following too closely is used. This, 
however, is misleading. Even though one crash in four is a "rear-endv 
collision, most such crashes are caused by delays in perception and 
response to the lead vehicle braking, and not a conscious decision to follow 
at a tlangerously close distance. Treat and associates (1980) report that 
other leading observable unsafe driving actions identified by the clinical 
investi~gations include: 
pulling in front of oncoming traffic (involved in 1 4  percent 
of all crashes); 
failure to stop at a stop sign or signal (seven percent); 
turning left in front of oncoming traffic (five percent); and 
unsafe lane change or merge (four percent). 
Preventing some of these actions is more difficult than others, because a 
driver usually does not decide in advance to "daydream," become 
distracted, or even fall asleep, Thus, left-of-center driving and what is 
widely but not always accurately called "following too c l o ~ e l y ~ ~  are 
different from such behaviors as improper speed selection, disobeying a 
traffic! signal, or passing a stopped school bus. We emphasize that 
conscious decision-making by a driver is an important criterion in 
identifying unsafe behaviors that can be reduced through societal action. 
Thus, conscious decision-making is essential to the definition of an unsafe 
driving act. The distinction between conscious and unconscious behavior, 
while i.t is not free from ambiguity in practice, does focus attention on 
general risk-management strategies that attempt to change a driver's 
decision from risk-taking to risk avoidance. Since a driver's decision 
whether to commit an unsafe driving action is hypothesized to flow from a 
balancing of the perceived utilities and disutili ties likely to follow the 
decision, risk-management strategies attempt to manipulate either the 
actual or perceived consequences of a driver's decisions. Speeding is a 
leading driving behavior that flows from a conscious decision to do so. 
Unconscious behaviors, such as many cases of inattention, are presumed not 
to flow from decision-making and might not be changed by the use of 
traffic sanctions and other efforts to change actual and perceived 
consequences. Thus driving behavior that is most amenable to risk- 
management strategies is both conscious and observable, such as speeding. 
Societal actions are best directed at behaviors that involve decision-making 
and the presence of which can be measured externally. This paper 
therefore will focus primarily on conscious decisions to drive unsafely. 
Decisions with respect to risk vary from one decision-maker to another. 
The decision is actually a two-step process. The first is risk assessment, 
an objective determination of how probable a given hazard is; the second 
is a safety determination, or a subjective determination of whether the 
risk is small enough under the circumstances to justify exposing oneself to 
the hazard (Lowrance 1976). Individuals may differ with respect to their 
risk assessments for a variety of reasons, including a lack of information, 
incorrect  information, or incorrect perceptions based on available 
information. Safety decisions are subject to even greater variation, even 
when individuals have relatively reliable information, for individual 
thresholds of acceptable risk will vary, as will individualst valuations of the 
benefits of a certain risky behavior. Some individuals will choose to take 
risks that society has determined are too great to tolerate, such as hunting 
without an orange colored jacket or using marijuana or cocaine. In many 
such cases society has passed laws to discourage such risk-taking and in 
effect has created the ltsurrogate'l risk of legal punishment to accompany 
the actual risk of engaging in the behavior. In other cases, society does 
not react to risky behavior by prohibiting it, but instead by providing the 
would-be risk-taker with information about its consequences with the intent 
that s~uch information, if known, would prompt a decision to avoid certain 
risky behavior. The familiar warning labels on cigarette packages are an 
example of the latter strategy. In a sense, too, placing a patrol vehicle in 
a visible location on an interstate highway ?linforms?t drivers of the risk of 
speeding. Still other societal strategies attempt to change the way 
individuals value certain kinds of behaviors, such as by portraying excessive 
drinking as the mark of a ??slobf? rather than ?lmacho?l behavior. All of 
these have in common the goal of changing the outcomes of decisions 
about risk. 
To explain how decision-makers choose between risk-taking and risk 
avoidance, i t  is necessary to examine the body of theory that explains the 
decision-making process. 
Decision-Making Theory 
A variety of theories and models in the social science literature seek 
to explain the conscious behavior of individuals and groups. Perhaps the 
best known of those theories are found in the empirical and theoretical 
literature in decision theory, the origins of which lie in mathematics. 
The first theory of decision-making was based on the concept of expected 
values. This was originated to facilitate better decisions about gambling. 
A gambler faced with a decision about how to bet on uncertain events 
should bet on the event that, on the average, maximizes winnings (Edwards 
1968). This assumes that the gambler knows the probability of each 
possible outcome, and the monetary value, or payoff, associated with each 
outconne. The expected value of a decision is the probability of an 
outcomie multiplied by its payoffs; the rational gambler will compute the 
expected value of each outcome and choose the course of action with the 
largest expected value. From its origins in gambling, expected value 
theory was soon applied to other aspects of human decision-making. 
Experimental investigations soon indicated that human decision-makers 
did not always behave in a manner consistent with that which was 
predicted by expected value theory; instances could be cited in which most 
persons consistently preferred choices with lower expected value over those 
with higher expected value. It was  evident that human decision-makers 
responded to factors aside from the mere computation of probabilities and 
payoffs (Marks et  al. 1981). Thus expected value theory was modified to 
account for expected  u t i l i ty ,  one's personal or subjective preference, 
rather than some objectively defined value (see Slovic, Fischhoff, and 
Lichtenstein 1977). In the context of transportation and traffic safety, it 
has been substantiated that drivers assign large utilities to fulfilling 
transportation needs by driving one's own vehicle (Finkelstein and McGuire 
1971). In fact, there is evidence that some view accepting risk itself as a 
u t ili ty--If f lirting with deathf1 is considered valuable to some persons (see 
e.g., Andriessen 1972). While expected utility theory helped explain why 
otherwise "rationalv persons1 choices could vary given similar sets of 
alternatives, anamolous results continued to occur: choice situations could 
be constructed in which subjects consistently preferred alternatives with 
lesser expected utility than other available ones. Again the data indicated 
that the dimensions of human decision-making were more numerous and 
less simple than those found in the model. 
A decision-maker computing the expected utility of an alternative 
considers both the size of the payoff (its utility) and the probability of its 
occurrence. It  has been found that individuals are poor at estimating 
probability (e.g., Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1977), and this tends to 
be especially true in the case of extreme probabilities, those near zero or 
near certainty (Phillips and Edwards 1966). Since the probability of a 
traffic crash or citation on any particular trip is extremely small, the 
probability of these events is especially likely to be misjudged. Some 
individuals appear to focus on the magnitude of the loss in a crash and 
expend more effort and resources than is warranted; others take the Ifit 
won't happen to mef1 attitude and exercise very little caution (Slovic 1978). 
Given no guidance, most individuals are very suboptimal in their allocation 
of resources for crash prevention; they need specific information regarding 
how to minimize the probability of a crash. 
Not only are individuals relatively unskilled in handling probability, but 
their estimates of probability are subject to a variety of distorting 
influences. The probability of events that are easily visualized, or that 
have happened to the decision-maker before, tends to be overestimated: 
Fischhoff et  ale (1976) found this to be the case with respect to fatal  
traffic crashes in comparison to "naturaln causes of death; in another 
study, most of the drivers responding to a survey grossly overestimated the 
probability of their being apprehended for a traffic law violation (Joscelyn 
and Jones 1972a). Assessments of probability are also subject to the 
perceptions of others; for example, subjects estimated the probability that 
an event would occur, and were asked some time later to recall their 
probability estimates. Those who were told the event in fact occurred 
flrecalledw higher probabilities than they first offered; those who were told 
i t  did not occur urecalledfl lower priorities (see Marks e t  al. 1981), 
Impairment by alcohol, other drugs, or fa t igue  may a f f e c t  one's 
assessments of probability; some research suggests that many persons are 
more likely to take risks after drinking (Cutter, Green, and Harford 1973; 
Goodwin, Powell, and Stein 1973; Wallgren and Barry 1970). 
Not only do perceptions of probability differ from individual t o  
individual, but individual utility assignments differ as well. For example, 
most people view a vehicle as a means of transportation, but Klein (1972) 
points out that some adolescents view the car as a recreational facility 
and assign utilities accordingly. Wilde (1976) and Shor (1964) have 
analyzed the effect of social norms on driver decision-making; they found 
that the norms of the group to which the driver belongs have a substantial 
effect on decision-making. The driver's own attitudes and values likewise 
determine what utility assignments are made in driving decisions. There 
exists in most humans a tendency to udiscounttt delayed or long-term 
effects of risk-taking behavior, a phenomenon that may account for low 
levels of seat belt usage in the United States. Finally, impairment may 
prevent a driver from recognizing a potentially disutili ty-produci ng 
situation, for example, by diminishing visual acuity (Newman and Fletcher 
1941) or the ability to concentrate (Moskowitz 1974). 
Although this paper stresses conscious behavior that results from a 
decision-m aking process, a portion of driving behavior is not conscious. 
For example, speeding because the driver follows the pace se t  by other 
traffic and does not realize his or her own speed, is not conscious. Some 
drivers act from internalized tTscriptsll and fail to process information 
relating to the magnitude and probability of hazards and payoffs; for 
example, they drive fast because a favorite actor does so in his motion 
pictures. 0 t her drivers, while they are not script-followers, nonetheless 
make decisions without considering certain critical items of information, or 
fail to use all the information at their disposal. 
In sum, then, human decision-making is much more complex than was 
suggested by earlier mathematical models of expected value or utility, 
Human beings make decisions on the basis on incomplete information or 
fail to use all available information. Studies show that most individuals 
are not skilled in applying probability concepts, especially in the case of 
rare events such as serious traffic crashes, Prior experiences and the 
influence of others also can distort probability assessments. Regarding the 
assignment of values and utilities, drivers differ from one another, and 
utility assignments are determined by personal beliefs and attitudes as well 
as the influence of others. Some driving behavior is not the product of 
conscious decision-making at all. Nevertheless at  least some risky driving 
flows from a conscious decision that can be controlled by societal action 
directed at the decision-making process; and, in many cases of unsafe 
driving, the  specific behavior can be measured externally and the 
effectiveness of many societal strategies can be measured by external 
observation. 
DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY THEORY 
A 'traffic crash problem was doubtlessly perceived by the public early in 
this clentury, when large numbers of automobiles began to appear on the 
nation's highways. Crashes were one of a variety of problems associated 
with nlotor vehicles; others included noise and pollution, problems that also 
persist to this day. Early concern over the dangers resulting from 
improper driving took the form of legislation prohibiting excessive speed, 
drunk driving, and other unsafe actions; and setting down the rules of the 
road. 
Official concern over the traffic crash problem has been expressed in 
the United States since the early 1920s; however, i t  was not until the 
mid-1960s that serious efforts were made to develop a comprehensive 
theory for understanding and solving the  problem. Six National 
Conferences on Street and Highway Safety, held between 1924 and 1949, 
identified and described safety issues of major concern, but failed to 
produc'e even an adequate foundation for a nationwide program in highway 
safety (U.S. Department of Transportation 1975). In 1 9 5 2  the National 
Academy of Sciences1 Highway Safety Research Correlation Conference 
reviewed the state of knowledge in highway safety, and observed that 
despitle a need for ltlarge-scale research involving systematic study of 
interrelated variables," most research had consisted of relatively small- 
scale efforts "to solve an immediate problem, or isolated studies carried on 
by individual investigators with relatively small resources to call upontT 
(National Academy of Sciences 1956). The National Academy of Sciences 
report recommended several broad areas of driver-oriented research, but 
those isreas were not comprehensive, nor was any structure presented for 
generating the integrated program the report called for. Additional 
stimullus for an organized attack on the highway crash problem resulted 
from a 1958 meeting of the President's Committee for Traffic Safety, 
called the Williamsburg Conference, but most of that meeting's 
recom nl endations followed a "shopping list" format and were not explicitly 
related to any overall strategy of research and action (Joscelyn and Jones 
1977).  
With increases each year in the number of vehicles using the highways 
and in miles traveled, highway crash losses increased. In 1966, when the 
annual death toll stood a t  53,000 (National Safety Council 1980) then- 
President Johnson asked the Congress to initiate an l1aggressive highway 
safety programM (U.S. Department of Transportation 1975). The immediate 
response was in the form of two acts of Congress: the Highway Safety 
Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-564); and the Motor Vehicle Act of 1966 
(Public Law 89-563). These acts created two federal agencies to 
administer a national program of highway safety. One of these agencies 
was absorbed into the Federal Highway Administration within the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT); the other has become the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), also within the DOT, 
The federal activity during the 1960s was accompanied and followed by 
other efforts to solve the problem of traffic crashes. Under sponsorship of 
the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Arthur D. Little, Inc. (1966) 
conducted the landmark study, "An Analysis of the State of the Art of 
Traffic Safety." The automobile and insurance industries established new 
programs of extramural research (Highway Safety Research Institute 1968; 
Bonder, Cleveland, and Wilson 1967); and the RAND Corporation was 
commissioned by the federal government to develop a comprehensive 
approach to highway safety efforts (WON 1968a,b), Numerous conferences 
were held to define future programs of research and action (e.g., Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety 1968; Miser 1967). 
In the course of addressing the problem of highway crashes, several 
theories and conceptual frameworks of the highway safety process began to 
emerge. The first of these grew out of a simple classification scheme, 
implicitly accepted in the field since the 1920s but not formally 
articulated until the late 1940s when the characterization of traffic 
crashes as a public health problem gained wide support (Gordon 1949). 
Under the public health approach, factors related to crashes were likened 
to factors considered in the epidemiologic approach to the control of 
diseases, namely actions against the host, the agent, and the environment. 
Applied to the control of highway crashes, actions were directed against 
the driver (host), the vehicle (agent), and the highway (environment). 
The public health approach was further developed by Haddon and 
Brennsr, who asserted that highway crashes resulted from a three-phase 
sequence of interactions among the driver, the vehicle, and the highway 
(Haddon 1968). The Haddon-Brenner model was a nine-cell matrix, 
matching the three phases of precrash, crash, and postcrash against the 
three factors of the human, the vehicle (including vehicle equipment), and 
the en~vironment. The Haddon-Brenner model is depicted in Figure 6. This 
model was offered as a paradigm for the highway safety process in  
classifying existing knowledge, research, and ~countermeasuresfl to reduce 
crash losses (Haddon 1970). The Haddon-Brenner approach remains 
predominant in the field of highway safety, and remains the most 
commonly used conceptual framework for reducing highway crashes. 
At the same time the public health approach was developed, other 
researchers were recommending that the so-called "systems approachn be 
adopted. They urged the application of systems analysis, a discipline that 
developed during and after World War 11, to  manage large and complex 
aerosprsce projects. The National Academy of Sciences (1956) called for a 
systematic study of the highway crash problem but offered no structures 
for so doing. The Williamsburg Conference also used the term "systems 
approachn but did not describe the term or present a conceptual framework 
for applying it. Arthur D. Little, Inc. (1966) advocated a systems analysis 
framework that first defined the highway safety objectives (reducing 
crashes and losses), next considered alternative approaches to achieving 
those (objectives, and then applied cost-effectiveness techniques to select 
the  preferred alternatives. The Arthur D. Little study found that 
identifying and selecting alternative means of reducing crash losses 
presented the greatest difficulty; i t  identified determining causes of 
crashes as an immediate need. In 1968 the RAND Corporation published a 
three-volume preliminary study of highway safety measures (Goeller 1968; 
Wohl 1968a,b), directed toward developing a conceptual framework dealing 
with events immediately surrounding a crash and primarily concerned with 
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the driver and the driver's interactions with the vehicle. 
The! most comprehensive conceptual framework of the early systems 
analysts was developed by Bonder, Cleveland, and Wilson (1967) at  The 
University of Michigan in the course of activities conducted to establish 
the University's Highway Safety Research Institute (HSRI). Bonder and 
associa.tes focused on the nation's highway transportation systems; a 
hierarchy of its subsystems, such as the vehicle, the driver, highways, and 
casualty recovery facilities; and its components, including, for example, 
such vehicular components as engines and transmissions. Highway safety 
was to be achieved through design, operation, and control of the highway 
transportation system. The primary llcontrol strategistf1 in the system was 
the driver, who decided, for example, when to pass, how fast to  travel, 
and how to avoid hazards. A 1968 study conducted by HSRI described a 
Highw,ay Transportation System as a complex of four in terac t ing  
subsystems: drivers, vehicles, roads, and pedestrians. The 1968 HSRI 
report expanded the Haddon-Brenner framework to include two more 
phases, namely llconditioningll or preparing the system for normal 
functioning; and lltraffic,ll or normal system functioning. The Highway 
Transportation System was also described in relation to its physical and 
social lenvironment as well as to a so-called "highway services system" that 
facilitated the use of the highways in emergencies and other extraordinary 
purposes. A concurrent study by the Stanford Research Institute (Gray et 
al. 1968) produced a similar but less comprehensive and rigorous 
framework. 
We first presented a conceptual framework (Joscelyn and Jones 1972a) 
that viewed the problem of highway safety from a new perspective: that 
highway safety was a closed-loop control process, analogous to processes 
used to control physical systems. This framework is depicted in Figure 7. 
The objective of this process was to maintain the Highway Transportation 
System's "negative outputs11 (such as crashes) at a level low enough to be 
tolerated by society. Two areas of emphasis that did not appear in earlier 
systems frameworks were added: first, elements of society that must be 
influenced to reduce crash losses; and second, elements that originate and 
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apply measures, or risk-management forces,  to reduce those losses. 
Particular attention was paid to the process by which society controls 
crash risks, and the terminology was drawn from the new discipline of 
systems safety analysis (e.g., Reed 1972) and from the insurance industry 
(e.g., ;Snider 1964). Later work by Wilde (1976, 1975) applied the systems 
framework to analyze the role of individual driver behavior in causing 
crashes. 
Despite the work that has been done in applying systems principles to 
solving the traffic crash problem there is little evidence to indicate that 
any of the systems frameworks have been widely adopted in planning 
highway safety programs. For the most part the public health model of 
Haddon and Brenner remains the fundamental framework for analyzing 
highway safety problems and for generating solutions (Joscelyn and Jones 
1977). 
PROBILEMS WITH EXISTING HIGHWAY SAFETY THEORY 
It is almost axiomatic that to solve a problem, one must f i r s t  
adequately define it. In the case of highway crashes, billions of dollars 
are expended annually on police traffic services, highway improvements, 
courts and licensing authorities, and traffic safety research, all of which 
are directed at reducing the severity of the traffic crash problem. 
For years, a systematic approach to solving the traffic crash problem 
has be'en recommended. The highway safety literature is replete with 
discussions of the systematic consideration of all issues, emphasizing 
vsocietaltt aspects of traffic crashes and their management. Gordon, whose 
1949 analysis of the traffic crash problem was the ancestor of the 
Haddon-Brenner public health approach, described ttsocioeconomiclt factors 
as a major component of the environment in which traffic crashes occur, 
and characterized i t  as the most neglected influence of crashes.  
McFarland and Moore (1962) reemphasized Gordon's statement regarding the 
importance of the socioeconomic environment in analyzing traffic safety . 
The Williamsburg Conference was sufficiently concerned with the societal 
aspect of traffic safety to designate i t  one of three priority areas for 
discussion (the others were the systems approach, and the psychology of 
driver behavior). Bonder, Cleveland, and Wilson (1967) also recognized the 
need to include social and legal factors in a conceptual framework for 
highway safety, as did the HSRI study (1968). 
In spite of the repeated expressions of concern for the societal aspects 
of traffic crashes and highway safety programs, the dominant framework 
within the traffic safety field remains the public health approach of 
Haddon and Brenner. That framework does not explicitly include societal 
aspects; rather, it focuses on the crash problem alone. Such a focus is 
therefore too narrow. It implies that the traffic crash problem will be 
dealt with by some undefined !?external forces,ff but the relevant systems 
producing those forces are  nowhere represented. Many events not 
immediately associated with a traffic crash can nonetheless influence crash 
causation and produce losses. Focusing on the crash to the exclusion of 
more general examination of Highway Transportation System operations has 
resulted in too rapid closure, resulting in the failure to seek information 
that is important for crash reduction. For example, accident investigation 
studies to determine why people drove badly in situations that resulted in 
crashes are common, but few studies examine why people drove well and 
avoided crashes. Emphasis is placed on the crash problem to the exclusion 
of other information that may provide insight. Aside from its narrow 
focus, a second problem of the Haddon-Brenner framework is in its graphic 
presentation (see Figure 6). Its precise three-by-three matrix, with each 
cell the same size, conveys the impression of equality among the cells. In 
reality this is not so, 
In sum, the dominant framework in highway safety oversimplifies a very 
complex problem. Because its focus is on the crash alone, i t  suggests 
countermeasures that similarly focus on the crash, and may divert 
attention from other avenues of inquiry that might be effective. One can 
only speculate on why the Haddon-Brenner framework has gained such wide 
acceptance. Being problem-oriented, the framework perhaps fit the mood 
of a society that perceived traffic crashes themselves as the problem and 
that was eager to  move forward with action programs to solve i t .  
Perhaps, too, those who have a strong faith in the traditional "three ETsT1 
of education, engineering, and enforcement as the cure for traffic crashes 
found the framework compatible with their beliefs. Perhaps the framework 
was appealing because it was simple to understand and visualize, was 
expressed in familiar terms, and allowed conventional wisdom-that the 
traffic crash problem can be solved by allocating more resources to do 
m ore of the same--to proceed. Unfortunately, the Haddon-Brenner 
framework does not provide a mechanism for measuring its effectiveness, 
so that even though more of the same was done, the effect is largely 
unknown. 
The public health framework has dominated recent research and action 
prograims in highway safety, even though this approach appears to conflict 
with both the logic and the recommendations that appear in the highway 
safety literature. The most obvious consequence has been the narrow 
focus of research and safety programs on the crash process and on events 
that closely precede or follow the crash. In contrast, research on the 
general driving task has been limited. Perhaps more critical is that 
research examining the many relationships that create and support 
management systems that can reduce crashes is extremely limited. Past 
research has in general focused on more efficient delivery of police and 
other rserviees but has failed to question standing goals. Action programs 
also have been narrowly developed; they too have emphasized increasing 
the level of effort and better managing service delivery, rather than 
questioning basic assumptions about objectives or methods of delivery. 
This recitation of the weaknesses of the present framework does not 
suggest that all traffic safety efforts implemented to date have been 
wrong. What is suggested is that accepted approaches have not been 
rigorously evaluated and that there exist alternatives that have not been 
explored adequately.  Research and action programs have so far 
concentrated on efforts expected to have an immediate impact on crashes, 
especia~lly technological solutions emphasizing the vehicle and the highway 
rather than the driver. Research and programs focused on individual 
driving behaviors, and on institutional and societal responses to traffic 
crash risk, have been largely ignored. Because the latter areas are 
ignored, in comparative terms they recede rather than advance. The need 
exists for rigorous, large-scale research programs examining driver behavior 
and societal responses in a comprehensive structure, as well as for action 
programs that deal with the human factor in a broader fashion than today's 
conventional strategies. 
A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY 
The lack of balance in highway safety efforts flows from the lack of 
an underlying body of theory that can frame the highway safety process, 
describe its dimensions, and establish a body of rules for decision-making. 
In short, a new meta-theory is needed to describe the highway safety 
process. 
Traffic crashes and associated losses cause hundreds of thousands of 
casualties, and generate social costs totaling billions of dollars each year. 
Society, responding to this problem, has spent billions of dollars on 
measures to reduce its magnitude. Many of those efforts reflect an overly 
narrow focus, emphasizing traditional nsolutionst' a t  the expense of 
measures directed at the driver and taking into account society's existing 
systems for managing risks. This reflects continued reliance on the 
Haddon-Brenner public health framework for defining and solving the 
traffic crash problem, a framework that conflicts with authority calling for 
a systematic consideration of all issues, especially the societal aspects of 
traffic crashes and ways to reduce losses. There exists the need for a 
new meta-framework for describing the highway safety process. Such a 
framework should re la te  the loss-generating elements of highway 
transportation to the elements of society that attempt to control those 
losses. 
We have developed a conceptual framework that responds to this need 
(Joscelyn and Jones 1977). It is purposely called a conceptual framework- 
and not a theory-for in its present form it is not presented in sufficient 
detail to warrant its being labeled a formal theory or model. It is the 
first step toward development of a theory, and in its present form it is 
useful for describing how the highway safety process operates, Our 
proposed framework should be examined in that context. 
The conceptual framework, which is presented in overview form in 
Figure 8, has three basic elements: 
o The Highway Transportation System, 
Society, and 
Risk-Management Systems. 
In the highway safety process these elements interact to reduce crashes 
and resulting losses. 
The Highway Transportation System 
The first element, the Highway Transportation System (HTS), consists of 
the highway network, vehicles, system users (such as drivers), and 
suppor1:ing components, The HTS, thus defined, is similar to that found in 
previous conceptual frameworks, although i t  is defined in a somewhat 
broader context. 
The primary objectives of the HTS are to provide mobility with safety. 
Many secondary objectives also exist; these include, for example, providing 
recreation and pleasure for system users, providing a market for the 
automobile and transportation industries, and supporting the national 
economy. The top-level functions of the HTS may be described as the 
design, construction, operation, and support of the system as a whole and 
the co~lstituent parts of the system. 
The Highway Transportation System was created and has grown in 
Americlan society because it provides benefits, or utilities, for society in 
the course of performing its four toplevel functions. Utilities are the 
positive outputs of HTS operation, and include individual mobility, rapid 
transportation of goods, and social and economic well-being. YTS 
operations also produce disutilities, or negative outputs (sometimes called 
negative utilities in the literature). Chief among them are traffic crashes 
with associated deaths, injuries, and property losses. Other disutilities 
include environmental degradation and depletion of natural resources. 
The concept of disutility may be operationally defined in a number of 
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ways. This framework describes disutili ties as negative outputs, including 
lost productivity, welfare costs, and use of emergency services associated 
with al particular event such as a traffic crash. From a highway safety 
perspective, traffic crash losses are disutilities. Society is concerned with 
minimizing the occurrence of events that produce disutilities and, should 
they occur, with minimizing the loss. Such a perspective requires the 
consideration of future action about future events. To aid in thinking 
about future events that will produce loss, the term flrisk,ff the probability 
that a disutility-producing event will occur, is used. 
In the case of a traffic crash one is concerned with a series of risks, 
such as the risk of a traffic crash, the risk of a crashed occupant 
impacting on the interior of a vehicle, the risk of incurring fatal  or 
disabling injury, and the risk of additional loss because an injured person 
does nlot receive proper postcrash attention. 
Disutility and risk are important because they form the basis for 
societa.1 concerns that lead to societal action. 
Society . 
Society, the second major element, is broadly defined to include all 
individiuals and institutions, both public and private, that have a role in 
making decisions about Highway Transportation System operations, Those 
decisions may be individual choices of a system user (such as a driver's 
choice of speeds), public policy enacted by a legislative body (such as a 
maximum speed limit), or decisions by other participants in the system 
(such E ~ S  that of an owner of an apartment complex to place speed bumps 
in the driveways), Society observes the operations of the HTS and the 
utilities and disutilities i t  generates. When the magnitude of the disutility 
is so lisrge when compared to the utility that it evokes societal concerns, 
formal actions are taken to reduce the risks that create the excessive 
disutilities. 
Our earlier work on the Traffic Law System (Jones and Joscelyn 1976; 
Joscelyn and Jones 1972b) suggests that there exists a level of disutility 
that would produce formal public responses. We define this level as the 
maximum tolerable disutility. Disutility in excess of this level produces 
societal pressure for highway safety activity; conversely, when disutili ty 
falls below this level, soci e t a1 concern and support for highway safety 
actions decrease. 
Societal systems that reduce risk may be formal or informal. All  such 
entities may be termed risk-management systems. 
Risk-Management Systems 
Risk-management systems are formal or informal structures created by 
society to exert control forces on the Highway Transportation System to 
reduce risk. Risk-management systems operate to reduce risk to a level 
less than or equal to tolerable disutility. They do not eliminate risk, even 
though some systems may purport to. 
These systems are numerous and not well defined. They include formal 
systems such as the Traffic Law System, elements of which generate laws, 
enforce them, adjudicate guilt or innocence, and sanction offenders. Also 
included are parts of formal systems focused on broader aspects of society, 
such as health care delivery systems; and less formalized systems such as 
communications media used for public information and education. Aside 
from these more or less formal systems, there exists a wide variety of 
societal influences--such as customs, mores, ethics, folkways, family 
structures, and peer pressures-that also exert control forces; however, 
most of these influences have yet to be formally defined or their effects 
established. Still, many references are made to their existence in the 
highway safety literature as well as in the more general literature dealing 
with the management of such social risks as crime and disease. 
The Highway Safety Process 
Viewed in a broad perspective, the conceptual framework represents a 
process, Its object is t o  control disutility in a specific societal system, in 
this case, the Highway Transportation System. The highway safety process 
is one of disutility control. I t  can be thought of as one of several 
disutility control processes that act to reduce societal risks in the broadest 
sense. These processes compete for societyts resources to carry out 
control activities as exemplified by the competition, cited earlier, between 
traffic and crime-control activities within the Dayton Police Department. 
An analogy can be made between the highway safety process and 
closed--loop control systems used to regulate physical systems-for example, 
thermostats. The objective is to  maintain the output of the primary 
system within specified tolerances; in other words, to reduce the difference 
between desired and actual output (the system error) to zero. The control 
system monitors system error and applies control forces to the primary 
system to reduce error; the control forces increase in magnitude as the 
magnitude of system error increases. Continuous monitoring of system 
error isnd control forces allows for adjusting the strength of the control 
forces to reduce error, In physical systems, such continuous monitoring 
and acljustment eventually reduce the error to near zero, a t  which point 
the system is said to be "in equilibrium." 
In the highway safety process, society serves as the monitoring device, 
measuring both the system error and the strength of the control forces. 
System error is the difference between actual disutility and the maximum 
tolerable disutility. Control forces are supplied by the operations of risk- 
management systems. Society will act when the disutility level is higher 
than is tolerable. On the other hand, society will not tolerate a risk- 
management activity that produces unacceptable negative effects, such as 
the loss of mobility that would result from a national speed limit of 30 
miles per hour. 
Unlike a thermostat that objectively monitors a single physical property, 
society-human beings and insti tutions--moni t ors the functioning of the 
highway safety process. Thus the role that society plays is a fundamental 
limitation on the process. This fundamental limitation has its foundation 
in two basic constraints: first, the quality and communication of 
information on risk and risk-management operations; and second, societyts 
pereep~tion of risk and risk-management operations. These constraints are 
interrelated, since perception is a function of information; however, the 
constra.ints have quite independent attributes. 
Performance of the highway safety process depends first upon the 
quality of risk management information. That information must be 
available and useful, and must be communicated to each element of the 
system for use in decision-making about risk, Such information describes, 
first, the structure, components, functions, inputs, and outputs of the 
highway safety process; and second, the factors and processes that govern 
decision-making within the highway safety process. As used here the term 
tfcommunicatedft means not only transmission of information but also its 
reception and understanding. 
Understanding information constitutes a major portion of the second 
constraint on the highway safety process, which is societal perception. 
Even if complete and accurate information were available, society would 
continue to be guided by its understanding or perception of risk and risk- 
management activities in making decisions about the highway safety 
process. Society acts on the basis of perceived rather than actual values. 
Societal perceptions are the result of the shaping of many individual 
perceptions, not all of which are alike. Although the process of perception 
formation is ill defined and ill understood, available evidence suggests that 
a "perception gapv exists (e.g., Joscelyn 1975b; Worden 1973). Thus one 
ideal way of improving the highway safety process is to reduce the 
perception gap to zero, so that perceived risk equals actual risk. While 
one cannot realistically expect to eliminate the perception gap, any 
narrowing of the gap would provide society with a better basis for 
determining the level of safety efforts i t  desires. A new value of 
maximum tolerable disutility with a corresponding risk value would be . 
established as the perception gap narrows. In turn, the nature and extent 
of risk-management operations required to maintain risk at or below that 
level would be better defined. 
In general, perceptions are based on information but are altered by 
biases inherent in the receiver or the sender. The highway safety process 
consists of many information transmission and reception networks. Many 
societal mechanisms act as tlfilterslt that amplify or suppress the 
information that is transmitted, These same mechanisms also generate 
spurious information t h a t  affects perceptions. At every linkage, 
communication is inhibited by "noiseft t ha t  masks the  content  of 
information being transmitted. This noise inhibits the communication of 
information and the formation of accurate perceptions. That, in turn, 
reduces the quality of decisions about risk. Fliters and "noisev are basic 
constrisints, These filtering mechanisms are shown in Figure 9. The 
criticrsl roles of information, societal perceptions, and noise must be 
understood if the highway safety process is to be understood. 
HIGHWAY SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
The conceptual framework presented in this paper describes a process 
by which individuals and societal forces control the risk of traffic crashes 
and associated losses, Risk, the probability that a hazard will occur, is 
objectively determined from such data as the frequency and severity of 
accidei?ts. On the other hand, safety is a subjective judgment regarding 
the personal or social acceptability of a particular risk. While individual 
judgments concerning safety differ, they are determined in part by such 
considerations as whether a hazard is avoidable; whether its effects are 
immediate or delayed; what alternatives exist to a specific risky behavior; 
how widely the hazard affects the population; whether the hazard is 
commoln or "dreadw; and whether the effects are permanent (Lowrance 
1976). Societal judgments concerning safety are roughly the sum total of 
individual judgments; however, such factors as social traditions, the 
presence of vested interests, or the actions of powerful advocates of a 
particular viewpoint may distort the overall societal response h i they  and 
Cole 1980). 
Society does not act to eliminate risk; rather, it seeks to reduce risk 
to a tfsafe,u or socially acceptable level. This process has been termed 
risk management, an approach to decision-making under risk conditions. 
It emerged from an awareness that decisions and subsequent acts can 
affect the probability, the type, and the extent of potential losses. 
Ideally, risk management is based on a com prehensive understanding of 
those systems that interact to produce and affect losses, their magnitude, 

and tlheir probability, It stresses evaluating the expected costs and 
benefits of alternative decisions with respect to their expected effects. 
Applield to human activity as a whole, the goals of risk management are, 
first, l:o reduce uncertainty (or reduce the negative results of uncertainty); 
and, second, to optimize some set of benefits in light of uncertainty. 
The term "risk managementff apparently was coined by corporate 
insurance managers beginning in the mid-1950s (Gyory 1964); consequently 
the insurance industry is an appropriate starting point for a discussion of 
risk management. During the 1920s corporate insurance buyers formed 
associations that resulted in formation of the National Insurance Buyers 
Associcstion and later, the American Society of Insurance Management. At 
the same time, there was a trend toward separate insurance management 
and, for example, fire prevention departments within railroad, oil, or food 
corporations, These trends signaled a change in businessesf attitudes 
toward loss. Previously businesses assumed that losses resulting from fire, 
accident, and injury were inevitable; they simply bought enough insurance 
to cover projected losses. Managers responsible for obtaining insurance 
began to experiment with a combination of strategies-including prevention- 
-to reduce overall losses. This required a more active role in assessing 
risks, insurance costs, and savings, using proper coverage. 
Still, the definition of risk was narrow. The corporate risk manager's 
function was restricted to managing financial risks. In many cases risk 
analysis began and ended with a consideration of the corporate balance 
sheet; under this approach personal injuries were relevant risks only to the 
extent of their economic repercussions (Gallagher 1964). Managers furtber 
limited the scope of their activity to minimizing the so-called ??pureff risks, 
those resulting from the ownership of property, but not the so-called 
ffbusinessN risks taken in the hope of making a profit (Parrett 1964). 
Finally, preventive efforts to  abate or reduce risks remained separate 
functions from those of the risk manager; these were entrusted instead, for 
example, to the manager in charge of fire prevention or industrial safety. 
During the 1960s the scope of corporate risk management expanded as 
the insurance and safety responsibilities were merged. A t  that time more 
formal procedures were developed for assessing and managing a wider 
variety of risks, such as loss of time, damage to corporate good will, and 
the interruption of services. The risk management literature stressed 
careful analysis and quantitative evaluation of risks and alternative 
management strategies (Rennie 1961). These developments reflected the 
influence of operations research and the increasing use of systems analysis, 
By 1970 risk-management theory had developed as a relatively 
comprehensive process reflecting the emerging flsystems philosophy." Since 
then risk management has undergone few radical changes. There has been 
an increased understanding of, and insistence upon using, a systems 
approach that considers all relevant aspects of risk. Management by 
objectives--which requires a delineation of top-level organizational 
objectives or goals, in turn divided into more specific and action-guiding 
objectives--has come into wide use. In recent years measurement 
techniques have been refined to account for deaths and injuries, and 
mathematical models have been used. In general, risk-management 
techniques have experienced tremendous growth in the military and 
aerospace industries as well as in solving such policy issues as those 
involving waste disposal and energy systems. There has been increasing 
interest in the application of broad, systematic analysis to more amorphous 
social problems such as urban decay, public education, and traffic safety 
(Joscelyn and Jones 1977). 
Risk-management procedures were originally developed in the context of 
insurance. From this relatively narrow beginning, risk management has 
become a broad management strategy in situations where uncertainty 
exists. Although it  makes use of a body of methods that are closely 
identified with systems analysis, decision analysis, and operations research, 
risk management should not be viewed only in methodological terms. 
Rather, i t  is an approach to managing and organizing efforts given the 
presence of risk. It is therefore applicable to  efforts to  manage the 
traffic crash risk. 
IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK 
Management of risk is a process that is analogous to other management 
processes. The body of theory that describes risk management can be 
applied to management of the traffic crash risk. Application of basic 
risk-management principles can improve the operation of the highway 
safety process. 
THE RISK-MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
In the insurance industry, a stepwise process of risk management has 
devel~oped (see, e.g., Snider 1964). We further defined that process in the 
specific context of traffic safety. The process consists of six discrete but 
interrelated steps, These may be taken by an individual in making 
personal decisions about a course of action to follow; by institutions in 
developing formal control actions; by public entities in generating formal 
public! policy; and by society in generating demand for and support of the 
highway-saf ety process. 
The steps may be succinctly stated as follows: 
Identify the risk; 
Establish priorities among risks; 
Determine the allocation of resources; 
e Select risk-management strategies and tactics; 
Implement risk-management actions; and 
Evaluate outcomes in terms of risk reduction (Joscelyn and Jones 
1978). 
The first step, risk identification, is the most critical, since it 
determines whether society and its risk-management systems will respond 
at all. Identifying a risk means determining its magnitude, and also 
effec1;ively communicating it to all persons affected by the risk. Once the 
risk is identified and communicated, and that information is received by 
the intended audience, perceptions of risk are created. Increased 
perception of risk leads individuals to engage in risk avoidance; to support 
the creation, funding, and operation of risk-management systems; and to 
cooper a t e  with risk-management systems as their risk-management 
strategies are implemented. Not only must information regarding risk be 
communicated, but it must be communicated in enough detail to support 
further risk-management action. Specifically, information must exist 
concerning how risk is created and what disutilities result, and when and 
why. 
As we already pointed out, existing information describing the traffic 
crash risk and comparing it with other societal risks is apparently not well 
understood. Society appears to view traffic crashes as less of a societal 
problem than other risks that create less loss. Also, the crash causation 
data indicate that human factors are the leading cause of traffic crashes. 
This suggests that greater efforts are warranted to identify, and 
effectively communicate, the magnitude of the traffic crash risk. Further, 
it suqgests that human factors must be examined in greater detail to 
develop information to support risk-management activities. Many failures 
appear to warrant action directed at the driver--but not all such failures 
dictate human-oriented action. 
After crash risks are identified, the second step is to establish 
priorities among them. This involves ranking specific crash risks, or 
classes of risks, in order of the magnitude of the threats they pose to 
society. To deserve priority, risks must be associated with a reasonably 
high probability of occurring and, should they occur, the disutility must be 
sufficiently undesirable. A major requirement of highway safety research 
is to provide operational definitions of hightt and "sufficiently 
undesirable." Frequent events that create great disutility when they 
happen deserve the highest priority, rare events with very low disutility 
the lowest priority. Establishing priorities among risks is actually the first 
of three steps that are closely interrelated. The other two steps, 
determining the allocation of resources and selecting risk-management 
st rat egies and tactics, involve designing comprehensive programs of risk 
reduction and dealing with unacceptably great risks. 
Allocation of resources, the third step, takes place in two contexts. 
The first reflects society's general decision to allocate resources to a given 
class of risks relative to other classes of risks, such as highway safety 
verae cancer. The second context relates to how resources are allocated 
to strategies and tactics aimed at  a particular class of risks, such as how 
highvvay safety resources are to be spent. 
The four th  step, s e l ec t ing  s t r a t e g i e s  and tactics, must be a 
systematic analysis. The nature, magnitude, dynamic characteristics, costs, 
and societal acceptability of control forces associated with expected 
effects must be considered. This systematic process is generally not 
followed today, even though claims are made by a multitude of system 
maria-gers that they in fact apply such methods. If used, a systematic 
analysis is likely to identify some risks that cannot be reduced to desired 
levels by using existing strategies. These risks must be addressed through 
research to identify and evaluate new control forces. 
After risks have been identified and ranked, and after programs are 
developed to deal with them, the fifth step is to implement risk- 
management actions. Here, all activities needed to operate a risk- 
management program are performed. These range from providing funds to 
actually applying control forces and include, for example, recruiting and 
training personnel, monitoring operational methods and procedures, and 
purchasing equipment. Implementing programs, like selecting strategies and 
tac t ics ,  should follow a systematic process: personnel, equipment, 
facilities, and other resources should be allocated on the basis of how 
much they contribute to the effectiveness of the total risk-management 
systeim. Presently the systemwide coordination necessary for such an 
approach seldom occurs (Joscelyn and Jones 197 2b). 
The final step, evaluating outcomes, is intended to identify effective 
contrbol forces and risk-reduction programs so that they may be more 
widely applied; and to identify forces and actions that have not worked, so 
that they may be improved or discarded. An evaluation must be related in 
some reasonable way to the reduction of risk. Reliance on such ultimate 
measures as the actual reduction of crash losses is probably not feasible 
for rr~ost programs, especially local ones. It is instead more reasonable to 
focus on a particular category of risk (such as the proportion of drivers 
traveling 15 or more miles per hour above the speed limit) and measure 
change in that risk (such as the reduction in the excessive speeder 
population), Results of evaluations must be communicated to risk- 
management systems and to society, Whether society is willing to tolerate 
and support risk-management activity depends on its perceptions of 
benefits. Frankness in sharing information of a program's successes and 
failures is a necessity. This also requires that programs not be oversold, 
for evaluations that show no reduction in risk can produce disastrous 
consequences for program managers who have promised too much. It is 
necessary to develop a clear societal understanding of how complex the 
traffic crash risk and the highway safety process really are, and that 
simple, societally acceptable solutions to the crash problem are unlikely to 
be found soon. 
THE TRAFFIC LAW SYSTEM: AN ILLUSTRATION 
The T~af f i c  Law System (TLS) is the best known formal risk- 
management system within the highway safety process. It is society's 
formal mechanism for applying law to manage the traffic crash risk. Law 
is applied in a variety of ways. In a positive sense, it provides guidelines 
for normal operations of the Highway Transportation System. These 
guidelines provide a series of common expectations (for example, that all 
drivers will use the right-hand side of the road) that facilitate daily 
activity . These guidelines, drawn from theoretical understanding of risk, 
suggest or require conduct that reduces risk. 
The law is also used in a negative sense to prohibit actions that create 
increased risk. The law provides a formal system for dealing with 
individuals who violate the prohibitions. This use of the law stems mainly 
from the legal concept of deterrence: undesired behavior can be 
prevented by the threat of punishment. Most theories of deterrence are 
based on the hypothesis that a person contemplating a prohibited activity 
w i l l  refrain from acting if the expected benefits of that activity are 
outweighed by the expected costs resulting from threatened punishment 
(Andenaes 1974,  1966; Zimring and Hawkins 1973). The literature 
distinguishes between two forms of deterrence: special deterrence, which 
prevents the punished parties themselves from engaging further in the 
prohibited activity; and general deterrence, which discourages members of 
a group from engaging in the activity even if they are not caught and 
punisl~ed (Zimring and Hawkins 1973). 
Within the Highway Transportation System, the formal means of 
creating deterrent threats to unacceptably risky behavior is the Traffic 
Law System. The threats of fines, license suspension, and confinement to 
jail are the control forces of the TLS, these are applied as the TLS 
performs its four top-level functions of law generation, enforcement, 
adjudlication, and sanctioning (Joscelyn and Jones 1972b). The objectives 
of these functions are depicted in Figure 10. 
A wide variety of governmental agencies and institutions are involved in 
performing these functions. Because the American system of government 
is bar;ed on separation of powers, no single agency or institution is in 
charge of the entire system, and there is no "system managert1 for the 
Traffic Law System for any other formal control system. No "system 
specificationll  exis ts  for  describing what the TLS--or any of its 
components--should perform. In reality, the TLS is a "system of systems," 
each (operating more or less independently but all loosely bound together by 
a set of common principles. 
Law Generation is performed by federal, state, and local governments 
operating under legal constraints imposed by constitutions, federal and 
s t  a t e  laws, and court decisions. Legislative bodies create formal 
statements, called statutes, of what risks are prohibited and what the 
penalties are for engaging in risky behavior. Other statements, called 
regulations, are generated by administrative agencies in the executive 
branch of government. In addition to prohibiting risky behavior and 
specifying punishments, laws also authorize the operation of other system 
components, such as driver-licensing authorities and police departments, and 
provide direction for and constraints on their operation, such as arrest and 
c i t a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s .  De f a c t o  laws a re  generated by o ther  
instrumentalities of the government, for example, by setting speed limits 
Source: Jones and Joscelyn (197 6); Joscelyn (197 5a). 
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FIGURE 10 
THE FOUR TRAFFIC LAW SYSTEM FUNCTIONS 
AND THEIR OBJECTIVES 
Law Generation 
Define risk precisely; 
Prohibit behavior that creates risk; 
i, Prescribe behavior that reduces risk; and 
Provide for operation of the TLS through procedural guidelines, 
creation of the necessary entities, and funding them. 
Enforcement 
Detect and apprehend risk-takers for further system action; 
cr Manipulate human behavior to reduce risk; and 
i, Collect basic data to identify risk. 
Adjudication 
Determine if risk-taking occurred in the case of individuals 
apprehended by Enforcement; 
Determine validity of risk prohibitions by Law Generation; 
0 Provide fundamental fairness essential for system operation. 
Sanctioning 
Provide ultimate system response designed to ensure that the 
sanctioned individual will not engage in risk-taking in the future 
(special deterrence); and 
Provide a pattern of responses to  individual risk-taking that 
influences all potential risk-takers to refrain from such action 
(general deterrence). 
i 
and posting stop signs. More inf ormal-but nonetheless real-laws are 
created by individuals, for example, when a police officer directs traffic at 
an intersection (Joscelyn 1975a). 
Enforcement is performed by state and local police agencies. Primary 
operational subfunctions include detecting law violators, apprehending 
violat:ors, observing the suspect to help decide whether to arrest or issue a 
citation, and arrest and postarrest processing of the suspect. An important 
secondary subfunction of enforcement is to provide a deterrent threat to 
potential risk-takers simply through the presence of police or police 
symbols. Research suggests that police presence influences some driver 
behaviors, such as speeding, that are associated with some crash losses 
(Joscelyn, Bryan, and Goldenbaum 1978). Enforcement also supports 
operation of the entire Traffic Law System by providing information-such 
as arrest and citation records or accident reports--on the nature of the 
risk. 
Atljudication is most commonly associated with traffic courts, where 
the rules of criminal procedure are followed to determine the guilt or 
innocence of individuals accused of violating traffic laws. Major 
subfurictions of this process are determining the charge to be made against 
the suspect, and conducting a proceeding to inform the accused violator of 
the clharge and his or her rights, and to determine the guilt or innocence 
of the accused violator. The latter subfunction, commonly referred to as 
the "t.rialT1 when conducted by the judiciary, has as its objective the finding 
of fact and law related to a particular event and individual. 
It must be emphasized that the adjudication function is not always' 
p e r f o r m e d  by a cour t  or the  judicial branch of government. 
Driver-licensing authorities often hold administrative hearings in which 
findings of facts are made by a hearing officer. In some jurisdictions, 
such as New York and Rhode Island, some offenses have been 
'ldecriminalizedlt to  expedite the processing of less risky violations. 
Decriminalization means the removal of jail as a possible penalty, the 
relaxation of criminal procedures, and sometimes the transfer of the 
adjudilcation function from the courts to an administrative agency, such as 
the Department of Motor Vehicles. Still less formal adjudication processes 
often occur. For example, a police officer may decide after stopping a 
driver not to arrest or cite and to issue a warning instead, thus precluding 
further action by formal adjudication components of the system. Similarly, 
a prosecutor may decide not to charge or to reduce a charge in exchange 
for the offender's promise to undergo treatment for some condition, such 
as alcoholism, that led to the offense. In most instances, however, it is 
the driver who self-adjudicates after receiving a citation by pleading guilty 
or forfeiting bail (Joscelyn 1975a). 
Sanctioning provides the ultimate deterrent threat of the Traffic Law 
System. It can be performed by the judiciary (e.g., imposing a fine), by 
an administrative agency (e.g., by suspending a driver's license), or by a 
police officer (e.g., by issuing a warning). The purpose of the punishment 
is to prevent the punished individual from engaging in the risky behavior, 
and to influence other individuals, who wish to avoid punishment, not to 
engage in that behavior. 
The risk-management process is applicable in both "metau or system 
sense and in a vmicroll or individual agency sense. The basic steps of risk 
management are performed within each functional area of the Traffic Law 
System. Each individual or agency should deliberately go through each 
step to effectively and efficiently discharge the risk-management mission. 
In addition, each functional area has responsibility for performing some of 
the steps for the TLS as a whole. For example, the enforcement 
component has special responsibilities to develop information on risks and 
share them with other components of the system. In a similar sense, the 
law generation component must translate general information on risk into 
operational definitions of prescribed and prohibited behaviors. 
We have previously analyzed the performance of the Traffic Law 
System as a risk-management system (Joscelyn and Jones 1972b). We 
found that it was conceptually sound but had insufficient resources to 
manage Highway Transportation System risk effectively. The low level of 
resources available to the Traffic Law System reflected the public's 
misperception of the net disutility produced by the Highway Transportation 
System. We concluded that this misperception was caused by a lack of 
precise knowledge about risk and a lack of communication to the public of 
existing knowledge. Our study also found that risk-management principles 
often were not being applied by the TLS, Consequently, existing resources 
were not being effectively used. Minimal coordination among its various 
elements was found, resulting in a lack of common purpose and in actions 
that were counterproductive to achieving the system's ultimate objectives, 
namely to reduce crashes and associated losses. The failure of the TLS to 
I1oper(ate as a systemf1 resulted in serious inconsistencies in the Traffic Law 
Systemls interactions with the Highway Transportation System, society, and 
other risk-management systems. It has even resulted in nonperformance of 
major risk-management functions, especially risk identification, a t  the 
system level. The function of risk identification is most critical, 
becarise the entire decision process revolves around an understanding 
of tile nature of risk and the effects of control force actions on 
redwing risk. In general, the free flow of accurate information 
about risk and risk-management is the most fundamental and 
important requirement for the operation of the highway safety 
proce!ss. 

MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND NEEDS 
The conceptual framework we present in this paper can be used to 
analyze overall highway safety problems and needs in a more orderly and 
meaningful way than was previously possible. We have applied i t  to 
develop a top-level statement of management requirements to serve as a 
point of departure for more extensive analyses. 
Olur analysis focuses on management problems and needs, in particular, 
the decision-making process, Our framework for risk management places 
great emphasis on individual and societal decision-making. Decisions rest 
on information and perceptions. Perceived consequences of a decision 
af fec t  the decision process as much as the actual consequences. Good 
decisi.ons are more likely to be made if the decision-maker has accurate 
information. Communication of information within the highway safety 
system is necessary for management. Understanding how information flows 
within a system requires an understanding of the system. We have been 
unablle to identify any major research or act ion programs tha t  
syste~natically describe the highway safety process. 
Thus, we identify three general categories of management problems: 
describing the highway safety process; improving decision-making within 
the process; and facilitating communication within the process. 
These prob lems  are described in greater detail in the following 
sections. The descriptions are used as an analysis tool to develop need 
staternents that articulate the requirements for future analytical work and 
program development. 
DESCIRIPTION OF THE HIGHWAY SAFETY PROCESS 
Problems, The highway safety literature records no attempt to 
describe the entire highway safety process as a whole. The lack of a 
comprehensive theory has, in fact, precluded such a global presentation of 
the process. Researchers have yet to even describe all the elements and 
their components. The result has been fragmented, piecemeal descriptions 
of elements believed to be important to a given restricted analysis. Any 
analysis of the performance of the highway safety process as a whole has 
been impossible for the most fundamental of reasons: not all of the parts 
of the system have been identified. As a consequence of the fragmented 
conceptual frameworks used in past highway safety activities, the most 
neglected components of the highway safety process have been those 
related to control of crash disutility. While many major system 
components (such as drivers, vehicles, and roads) have been dissected to 
identify their constituent parts in great detail, very few studies have 
attempted to isolate and classify the societal and risk-management system 
components of the highway safety process. No effort to identify al l  of 
the significant parts of the societal and risk-management system 
components has ever been made. 
Similar problems exist in describing the functions of the highway 
safety process. Several studies have analyzed selected functions of the 
Highway Transportation System and risk-management systems, but few 
studies have attempted to develop hierarchies of functions in relation to 
top-level system and subsystem objectives. Not only has there never been 
a functional analysis of the entire highway safety process, but there has 
been no formal attempt even to identify all of these functions. With 
respect to the HTS, only the operational function has received much 
attention in the highway safety literature. Some detailed analyses of 
lower-level HTS functions involving interactions between driver and vehicle 
(called task analyses) have been conducted, but related functions that must 
be performed in the course of total driving 71missions11 (for example, a trip 
to the office on a busy expressway) have not been described in the same 
degree of detail. Some functions of some risk-management systems. (such 
as emergency medical or police traffic services) have also been identified, 
and in one case (the Traffic Law System) a formal functional analysis has 
been performed (Jones and Joscelyn 1976). However, the functions of 
many risk-management system components (for example, private safety 
foundations and insurance companies) have not been described in sufficient 
detail in the literature, and few functional descriptions have been related 
to the functions of risk management. 
Without a comprehensive list of components and functions of the 
highway safety process, the requirement for a structure interrelating the 
functions and their performance cannot be met. Thus there is no way of 
knowing exactly how any given function contributes to accomplishing risk- 
management objectives, or how that function affects the accomplishment 
of the objectives and functions of other components. As a result, control 
forces cannot be evaluated in terms of the functions that produced them, 
and the design and development of new forces are hindered by the lack of 
information about what works and what does not work in controlling crash 
disutility. 
With respect to the outputs of the highway-safety process, one 
requirement-describing the disutilities of the Highway Transportation 
Syst em--has been addressed most frequently by past highway safety 
research. However, such research has identified events immediately prior 
to ,  during, and following crashes, and has developed a variety of 
descriptions of the resulting disutilities. Thus risks and disutilities have 
not been adequately examined with respect to events or conditions that 
occur or exist far in advance or long after a crash; hence many potential 
opportunities for interdicting the series of events leading to disutility have 
not been identified. 
An  additional problem is that crash disutilities that have been studied 
have not been adequately described in terms that will support risk- 
management actions, that is, with respect to the risk associated with the 
disutil.ities, to other non-HTS risks, and to normative values of factors 
related to disutilities. Utilities of the HTS have received even less 
attention than the disutilities. Particularly, no attempt has been made to 
compare the utilities and disutili ties associated with particular activities or 
collections of activities, and to relate the resulting net utility or disutility 
to "riskyH or llsafell driving behavior. 
Muwh more attention has been given to identifying the outputs of the 
Highway Transportation System than the outputs of the risk-management 
systems. In general, neither the effectiveness nor disutilities of risk- 
management system control forces are known. The result is that resources 
are commonly wasted on ineffective safety programs, and potentially 
effective programs are rejected because their disutilities are perceived as 
greater than the crash disutilities they seek to reduce. The repeal of 
federal seatbelt-interlock regulations, and the repeal of mandatory helmet 
use laws for motorcyclists in some states, are examples of public refusal 
to accept ' l cu re~~~  they perceived as worse than the 'lillnessesfl they were 
directed against. 
Figure 11 summarizes existing major problems in developing a 
description of the highway safety process to support risk management. 
The problems are shown relative to the three major elements of the 
highway safety process: the Highway Transportation System, risk- 
management systems, and society. 
Needs. The first specific need is that each element of the highway 
safety process, and their components be identified and described. Our 
conceptual framework identified top-level components and gave examples of 
lower-level components, Additional groupings and classifications of 
components need to be developed and expanded to include each component 
whose activities are believed to have any significant impact on highway 
safety process operations. 
Next, the functions of the highway safety process need to be 
identified in hierarchical form. Top-level functions include providing fast, 
convenient transportation and maintaining Highway Transportation System 
disutility at a societally acceptable level. Lower-level functions include 
the design, construction, operation, and support of automobile equipment 
and highways. The primary functions of risk-management systems are 
identifying risks; setting priorities among risks; allocating resources; 
developing strategies and tactics; implementing and operating programs; and 
evaluating them. We identified the functions of one specific risk- 
management system, the Traffic Law System, discussed them briefly, and 
related them to the primary functions of risk-management systems in 
general. Similar but more detailed descriptions of highway-safety process 

functions must be developed so that all significant activities that pertain 
to the generation and control of disutility are known and related to the 
objectives of the highway safety process. 
Once the components and functions of the highway safety process are 
defined, they must be interrelated to form a detailed structure of the 
process. Each top-level function must be related to every other top-level 
function, and the components involved in performing that function must be 
identified. Similarly, interfunctional relationships must be developed among 
lower-level functions, so that, ultimately, a network of functions can be 
created. Such a network would, among other things, enable one to 
determine how any given activity performed by any given component might 
affect other activities and components. This would provide a major tool 
for the practice of risk management. 
The last major need for describing the highway safety process is to 
define its outputs. In the case of the Highway Transportation System, 
this means stating the utilities and disutilities associated with its various 
modes of operation, its components, and its function. For example, driving 
a t  a high speed in a large ttluxuryll car on an interstate highway has a 
positive utility, not only to the driver and passengers who want to 
minimize travel time, but to the manufacturer of the vehicle and those 
who build and maintain the highway. Even a direct disutility (such as a 
serious crash) may have utility to some segments of society, for example, 
automobile repair companies and hospital workers. It is essential to risk 
management that the significant outputs associated with HTS operation be 
specified in relationship to what individuals and organizations that receive 
the utilities and disutilities. Understanding crash causation, while it is an 
important element of this "output definitiontf requirement, is clearly only 
one of many elements. It is necessary to state disutilities not only in 
terms of the losses associated with a particular event but in terms of the 
probability (risk) that the event will occur. Further, to produce an 
effective risk-management response, disutilities must be described in 
relation to other disutilities (such as fire or disease) and their associated 
risks. 
The outputs of risk-management systems are control forces designed to 
maintain acceptable Highway Transportation Sys tem disutility. Control 
forces are more difficult to describe than the outputs of the HTS, because 
it is necessary to define not only their nature and origin but their 
purposes, effects, and costs. For example, a control force in the form of 
a driver license suspension must be examined to identify its purpose (such 
as preventing crashes involving teen-aged drunk drivers), its effectiveness 
in accomplishing its purpose, and the total cost of resources expended in 
applying that force. It is also important to identify any negative effects 
associated with application of that force, for example, the violation of 
fundamental constitutional rights by denying due process. 
Finally, the specific nature of societyfs lfoutputsfl must be known. 
These should be described in terms of required reductions in specific risks 
as well as what constitutes acceptable control forces for such risks. 
Meeting the above needs will produce a comprehensive and detailed 
description of the highway safety process. Kept u p  to date,  the 
description will provide a running history of the highway safety processf 
constituents, objectives, and outputs; such a description will comprise the 
first basic ingredient for designing, operating, and evaluating programs of 
risk management. 
DECISION-MAKING WITHIN THE HIGHWAY SAFETY PROCESS 
Problems. Considerable progress has been made in recent years in 
developing theoretical models of decision-making and in understanding 
psychological and social factors involved. Still no single, integrated theory 
of decision-making is available for rigorous application to the field of 
highway safety. 
Mttjor difficulties exist in translating existing knowledge from the 
behavioral sciences into terms that can be used to improve operational 
decision-making. For example, it is known that most people do not use 
information efficiently in estimating risk. But it is not clear how that 
knowledge can be used to better present information about crash risk to 
police officials. Moreover, it is known that human decision-makers tend to 
T1discountn the future. But is not clear how that knowledge can be used to 
stop legislators from responding only to short-term highway safety 
pressures and ignoring problems that will create far greater pressures later. 
Nevertheless, the greatest deficiency with respect to decision-making is the 
lack of effort to translate knowledge into operational terms. Thus, much 
potentially useful knowledge is not being used to improve perceptions and 
decision-making within the highway safety process. Failure to use existing 
knowledge is a major current problem. 
Research efforts to gather new knowledge in the area of human 
decision processes are inadequate. A recent study in England revealed only 
a handful of publications about decision-making that were relevant to 
highway safety. In the United States, no federally sponsored programs are 
concerned with describing current perceptions about risk within the highway 
safety process could be identified. Only a limited amount of research 
examining how perceptions about crash risk are formed and how decisions 
about risk responses are made was found. Thus, present knowledge about 
decision-making is not being used, and there are essentially no programs to 
promote the use of this knowledge or to develop new knowledge. 
Needs. Important factors in deciding how to deal with Highway 
Transportation System risk must be identified and described. Three 
specific needs are germane to decision-making within the highway safety 
process. 
The first need relates to formation of perceptions about the outputs 
of the Highway Transportation System and risk-management systems. We 
noted earlier that perceived risk often does not equal actual risk and that 
perceptions about utilities of the HTS and disutilities of risk management 
system control forces may also be inaccurate. Thus, there is a need to 
determine the nature of these perceptions, and to understand how those 
perceptions are formed. It would be useful to know, for example, how 
perceptions of crash risk due to speeding vary with demographic 
characteristics and whether speed are more effective deterrents to 
some groups of drivers than to others. 
The concept of maximum tolerable disutility due to crashes is an 
esse~lltial element of highway safety. This reference value of disutility 
must be described for different groups of individuals from the Highway 
Transportation S ys tem, risk-management systems, and society in general. 
The need for such knowledge is fundamental because it forms the basis for 
determining specific risk-management system objectives. Such information, 
combined with information about actual and perceived disutility, allows one 
to ascertain if society's safety requirements are being met and the extent 
to which control forces should be applied to meet those requirements. 
For example, if the maximum acceptable risk of an average driver's 
being killed in a crash over a driving lifetime is one chance in 1,000, and 
the actual risk is actually closer to 20 chances in 1,000, this knowledge 
could have very significant implications for risk management. Such 
knowledge would indicate  tha t  risk-management systems are not 
satisfactorily accomplishing their objectives, for actual risk greatly 
exceedes acceptable risk and perceived risk is much lower than actual risk. 
On the other hand, a finding that drivers who use a heavily patrolled 
roadway during nighttime hours can expect to be involved in some kind of 
serious crash once in every 1,000,000 trips, when their safety requirement 
is no more than one serious crash in 100,000 trips, might indicate a 
misallocation of police resources. In either case, maximum tolerable 
disutility must be known to measure the performance of risk-management 
systems. 
The last need in this category is to understand how decisions about 
responses td risk are made. In the case of the Highway Transportation 
Systern, this means, for example, that one understand why one driver will 
resportd to a given perceived risk by avoiding it, while another driver's 
response will be to accept the same risk. By the same token, the public 
in one! jurisdiction may demand immediate action against a given perceived 
risk, but the same risk in another jurisdiction may leave the public 
apathetic. Finally, one police agency may respond to a given increase in 
perceived risk by allocating more patrol cars to a specific location; but a 
police agency in another, apparently similar, jurisdiction may take no 
action at all to deal with the same increase in risk. Thus, there is a need 
to know the significant factors that lead to such wide differences in 
responses to the same perceived risk, and to know how to manage these 
factors to obtain optimal responses from the decision-makers. 
COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE HIGHWAY SAFETY PROCESS 
Problems. No system-wide information system has ever been designed 
for the entire highway safety process, and there is no record of any 
analysis of what content, form, or method of delivery of information is 
needed by various components of the process. Formal information 
"systems1' that do exist are mainly repositories where information is stored 
rather than disseminated. These repositories are usually designed to meet 
the needs of specialized user groups, most frequently researchers, and are 
most often located at the facilities of the user groups. Such repositories 
include the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Fatal 
Accident File; The University of Michigan Highway Safety Research 
Institute's Library; and repositories maintained by such safety foundations 
and associations as the National Safety Council, the Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Association, the American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators, and the Transportation Research Board. A few information 
flservices,u for example, the Transportation Research Information System 
(TRIS), exist for the benefit of those who seek highway safety information; 
however, some familiarity with both the literature and the organization of 
the retrieval systems is necessary for effective use of these services. 
The most serious problem in communication is in meeting information 
needs of the public and of operational components of the Highway 
Transportation System and risk-management sys tems. There is not and has 
never been any ongoing, integrated program to provide these components 
information about risk and control forces. 
Efforts to communicate with the public have mainly taken the form of 
sporadic public information and education ~campaignsn supporting 
countermeasures aimed at particular behaviors associated with crashes, such 
as speeding and drunk driving. The effectiveness of most of these 
campaigns in modifying behavior has not been demonstrated. The highway 
safety literature provides no evidence that studies have been performed to 
determine what kinds of information, provided in what form to what 
groups, are required to enhance risk perceptions and to support rational 
decision-making regarding risk. 
With respect to risk-management systems, the major communications 
problem is in providing information that now exists in a form suitable for 
risk management at state and local levels of government. At these levels, 
operational risk-management strategies and tactics are developed, most 
resources are expended, and most control forces actually applied. 
However, state and local units of government have the least access to 
information needed for these functions. Unmet needs of these risk- 
management system components include concise state-of-knowledge reviews 
about risk, manuals for operating countermeasure programs, and surveys of 
the results of evaluations of past programs. 
Examination of past highway safety efforts leads to the conclusion that 
information that is currently available is frequently not used in the design 
or development of highway safety programs. 
The risk-management process has been described in some detail. This 
is not a new concept; i t  has been a part of the general management 
literature for many years. Still, one does not find such management 
concepts specifically incorporated within the literature on highway safety 
program management. 
Current highway safety program literature refers to a three-step 
process--problem identification; program development and implementation; 
and evaluation--that, in a general sense, resembles the risk-management 
process, The difference lies in the emphasis the risk-management process 
places on identifying risk, establishing priorities, and evaluating 
implemented strategies and tactics in terms of risk reduction. Actual 
practice in the agencies and institutions that implement programs appears 
to ignore even the management concepts in the existing highway safety 
literature as well as basic risk-m anagement concepts. Programs are 
started as extensions or expansions of existing activity. Risk identification 
is not accomplished, and effective evaluation is a rarity. 
A major reason for this is the failure of state and local units of 
government to understand the systematic nature of their hiqhway safety 
efforts. Sufficient attention is not given to the organization and 
management of highway safety programs or to the institutions that 
implement programs. This lack of system management contributes to a 
fai lure to  use existing information, and a failure to develop new 
information through risk identification and evaluation. 
Part of this failure can be attributed to a general tendency of the 
public, policymakers, and highway safety specialists to ignore existing 
information on risk. Basic information on traffic crash causation has been 
reinforced by more recent, more detailed studies. Despite this 
information, resources are still allocated to engineering or technological 
solutions focused on the highway and the vehicle, with only limited 
resources available to examine the human element. We do not suggest 
that vehicle safety or programs designed to improve the highway 
environment cease or be reduced; rather, as priorities for allocation of 
resources are established, sufficient attention should be paid to the human 
element, In the next twenty years the Highway Transportation System will 
experience major transitions. Whether those can be accomplished with 
minimal disruption of our society will depend not only on technological 
solutions but on increased understanding of patterns of human behavior. 
The past practice of underestimating the human factor is reflected also 
in the design and development of programs that focus on drivers and other 
system users. Conventional wisdom has prevailed; most new programs are 
remarkably similar to the old. Policymakers have relied on the Traffic 
Law System as a risk-management mechanism. The TLS has been expected 
to be a deterrent to unsafe driving action. Drivers have been expected to 
perceive sanctions resulting from enforcement action as surrogate risks. 
Drivers, in making l1rationall1 decisions about courses of action, have been 
expected to consider the unfavorable outcomes. Since the risk of a crash 
has apparently not been sufficient to influence the behavior of many 
drivers, the risk of legal action has been used as an additional decision 
factor. The success of this strategy has been limited, because the level of 
enfor~cement is generally so low that the surrogate risk is not significantly 
more important than the crash risk in the human decision process. 
A more fundamental problem exists. Using the traffic law system is 
basicrally a negative reinforcement strategy, one of increasing disutility of 
risky behavior. A significant body of psychological literature establishes 
that  humans respond more effectively to  positive than negative 
reinforcement. Alternative strategies for driver control, that rely more on 
incentives than disincentives, should be considered. There are limits on 
the use of the criminal sanction, General and unrestricted use of the 
legal system for all aspects of driver control is likely to exceed those 
limits. Alternatives to the classic operations of the traffic law system are 
needed. Since that system has been the primary risk-management strategy 
at the state and local level, alternative strategies are needed for highway 
safety in general, not just for legal system activity. 
Figure 1 2  summarizes the major problems of communication within the 
highway safety process. The problems of describing the Highway 
Transportation System, improving decision-making within the system, and 
improving communication within the system, all stem from a lack of 
theory to focus action. They are direct products of the failure to use 
existing information and knowledge effectively, 
Needs. A body of knowledge about the nature and effects of the 
highway safety process is of little use unless the knowledge is disseminated 
and understood by the components of the process. Effective means of 
accuristely communicating information are thus a basic requirement for risk 
management. 
Three specific needs are generated by this general requirement. First, 
it is necessary to determine the nature of information needed by each 
component of the highway safety process, In general, each component will 
need at least some of each type of information defined by the above 

specific requirements, but the depth and scope of the information will vary 
greatly among components. For example, the information that traffic 
court. judges need to identify the risk due to drunk driving is different 
from the information needed by an automobile designer. Both need to 
know about the magnitude of the risk associated with various blood alcohol 
concentrations: the designer needs more detailed and precise information 
about how alcohol affects vehicle-driver interactions and thereby increases 
crash risk; on the other hand, the traffic court judge needs a more in- 
depth explanation of the effects of a given treatment regimen for 
alcoholic drivers. 
Individuals and organizations that are often not considered part of the 
highway safety process should also be provided information about highway 
safety and their role in it. For example, physicians should be aware that 
certain types of injuries are more likely to appear than other injuries and 
shoulcl be prepared to identify and treat those injuries when examining a 
crash victim. 
Secondly, the appropriate form and method of delivery of the 
information must be determined for each component of the highway safety 
process. For example, the automobile designer might best be reached 
through technical reports and journal articles, while traffic court judges 
might respond better to an intensive seminar involving colleagues and other 
peers who have specialized knowledge about alcohol-related crashes and 
treatment methods for alcoholism. The mass media would be a better 
vehicle for informing segments of the general public about alcohol-crash 
risk and what responses risk-management systems will take to that risk. 
Finally, continuing communications programs must be designed and 
implemented. The programs must provide needed information in effective 
form to all components of the highway safety process. 

CONCLUSIONS A N D  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The prior sections contain many findings, suggestions, and conclusions as 
the natural work products of an analysis. Our purpose here is to present 
some of the more important conclusions and recommendations as a point of 
departure for colleagues, researchers and practitioners alike, who we hope 
will critically carry forth the development and application of highway 
saf etjr theory. 
RECOMMENDED MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
Society, through individuals and their institutions, attempts to manage 
risk-producing factors to reduce the frequency of hazards or disutility- 
producing events, and to minimize losses when hazards do occur. Through 
this process of risk management, society seeks to reduce risk to a 
tolerable level, a t  or below maximum tolerable disutility. How much 
disutil.ity is tolerable is a complex balance between perceived utilities and 
perceived disutilities. 
O u r  conceptual framework identified a set of public and private 
institutions of greater or lesser formality that practice risk management of 
a more deliberate basis than private citizens, or society as a whole. Some 
of these institutions are linked together by working arrangements to form 
discrete and identifiable risk-management systems, such as the Traffic Law 
Systern. 
Form a1 risk-management systems-of which the Traffic Law System is 
one-attempts to reduce the disutility of the Highway Transportation 
Systenn by exerting control forces on it. Control forces include, but are 
not limited to, legal system actions such as apprehending violators. The 
strength of these forces depends on whether society perceives that 
disutilities have exceeded the maximum tolerable level. Control forces 
operate under a fundamental constraint, namely that forces may not 
themscslves generate more disutility than utility. 
Strategies to reduce traffic crashes and associated losses should begin 
with an understanding of the factors that create the risk. Analysis of the 
factors involved in traffic crashes identify human factors as a definite, 
probable, or possible cause in over 90 percent of all traffic crashes (Treat 
et al. 1977). However, vehicle and environmental factors are significant in 
t ra f f ic  crash causation, and vehicle- or environment-orien ted  
countermeasures may be superior means of responding to some human 
behaviors, Hiett and associates (1 97 5) developed initial definitions of 
unsafe driving actions, or UDAs, that are both observable and measurable, 
/ and that can be managed by appropriate legal or social strategies. 
Lohman and associates (1976) a t  the University of North Carolina 
attempted to assess the relative priority among the various UDAs in the 
context of their rate of involvement in crashes. These studies led to the 
identification of three UDAs--speeding, following too closely, and driving 
left of center-for more detailed examination. These were characterized 
as "priority UDAsw on account of their prevalence as traffic crash factors. 
Treat and associates (1980) at the University of Michigan continued the 
UDA analysis. They developed more rigorous definitions of UDAs based on 
nationwide data on crashes involving UDAs. 
Our definition of a UDA requires an act resulting from conscious 
decision-making by the driver. That decision process encompasses a 
balancing of the perceived utilities and disutilities associated with 
committing the UDA.  If the perceived utilities outweigh the perceived 
disutilities, the driver decides to commit the UDA. A driver's balancing 
process is not necessarily deliberate or even "rationalu in the usual sense 
of the word. Also, the utilities and disutilities associated with a given act 
are not necessarily the same for all individuals. In deciding whether to 
commit an unsafe driving act, a driver's decision-making process is 
influenced by information on the outcomes of his or her past unsafe 
driving (such as whether a crash or traffic citation occurred), the outcomes 
of unsafe driving actions of other drivers (for example, seeing a driver 
stopped by a police officer) and risk-management actions taken prior to his 
or her unsafe driving act (such as the number of violation points on the 
driver's record). 
Risk-management actions are directed at changing driver decisions from 
risk-taking to risk avoidance. These may be general or special. Special 
risk-management actions are those taken by society to discourage a driver 
from engaging in risky behavior in the future; the best known action is 
issuing the driver a traffic citation that the driver will remember later on. 
General risk-managem ent actions are taken to discourage all drivers- 
whether or not they were the targets of special risk-mangement actions- 
from engaging in risky behavior; a good example of this is the flhalon 
effect a parked patrol vehicle has on traffic in its vicinity. Both special 
and general risk-management actions provide drivers additional information 
to use in deciding whether to commit an unsafe driving act. 
Because a Ifgo, no gov decision regarding an unsafe driving act is the 
produrzt of balancing perceived utilities against perceived disutilities, driver 
decisions may be influenced by reducing the total utility of engaging in 
risky behavior (in which case it  is termed a positive strategy) or by 
increalsing the total disutility of the behavior (a negative strategy). Past 
approaches to highway safety have focused almost entirely on increasing 
the dlisutility of unsafe driving. This is because societyts principal 
approach to managing the traffic crash has been to use the Traffic Law 
Systern. Operation of that system is based primarily on the legal'principle 
of del:errence, or establishing a threat of punishment that is so certain, so 
severe, and so immediate that it discourages individuals from engaging in 
the prohibited conduct. Thus legal sanctions such as fines, violation points, 
license suspension or revocation, and even confinement to jail, are the 
predominant means of reducing the incidence of driving behavior that is 
likely to cause traffic crashes. 
The threat of law system action is only one of a range of disutilities 
that al driver considers in making a decision whether to commit an unsafe 
driving act. There are many other disutilities that are not usually 
considered by risk managers in developing highway safety countermeasures. 
Applying basic concepts of decision-making and social control, we identified 
a series of general risk-management strategies directed against one specific 
unsafe behavior, namely speeding (Joscelyn and Jones 1981). Most of these 
did nclt rely on the Traffic Law System. Presuming that UDAs are the 
product of a conscious decision-making process in which the driver balances 
the perceived utilities and disutilities that are likely to result, we 
identified four broad strategies of controlling the risks posed by unsafe 
driving behavior. They are: 
Decrease the utility of driving unsafely, 
Increase the utility of driving safely, 
Increase the disutility of driving unsafely (the predominant 
strategy today), and 
Decrease the disutility of driving safely, 
By "utilityv and "disutilityfT are meant perceived utility and disutility, 
respectively. A driver who believes that the chances of being stopped for 
drunk driving are one in three will likely decide not to drive while 
impaired, even though the actual probability of apprehension is believed to 
lie somewhere between one in 200 and one in 2,000 (Jones and Joscelyn 
197  8). Changing a driver's perception of what consequences will likely 
follow a decision whether to drive safely can be as effective as--or even 
more effective than--changing the consequences themselves or their 
likelihood. 
The first strategy calls for decreasing the utility of committing an 
unsafe driving act. The reduction must be large enough so that the net 
disutility of unsafe driving now exceeds that of its net utility, with the 
result that the driver changes from a "go" to a "no go1' condition. For 
example, if a commercial trucker speeds to reduce travel time and is 
thereby rewarded with money or approval from his superiors, this strategy 
calls for reducing or eliminating the reward, such as ceasing to praise 
speeding employees or even changing the company's pay policies. Even if 
the actual decrease in the utility of speeding is small, information and 
education countermeasures can create in the driver the perception that the 
decrease in utility is large enough to create the desired effect, namely a 
decision not to speed. 
The second strategy involves increasing the utility of not 
committing an unsafe driving act. In effect, rewards are offered to 
those who drive safely, such as company bonuses for drivers with crash- 
free records. Again, the reward--actual or perceived-must be large 
enough to change a decision to drive unsafely to a decision to drive safely. 
Information and education are especially instrumental in changing 
perceptions regarding the increased utility of safe driving. 
The third strategy, increasing the disutility of committing an 
unsafe driving act, is the classical negative approach to behavior 
rnodi:fication and is the operating principle of the Traffic Law System. 
When this strategy is applied by the TLS, it is called deterrence. The 
punishment, or threat of punishment, for committing a prohibited unsafe 
driving act is a llsurrogatefl risk added to the inherent risks of speeding, 
disobeying traffic-control signals, and the like. Negative approaches do not 
have to rely on the Traffic Law System. Other risk-management systems 
have appeal because they are not bound by such constraints as fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, and legal 
requirements of proof and procedure, the way the Traffic Law System is 
constrained. For example, insurance flsyst emsf1 can impose punishments, in 
the form of rate increases, following an at-fault accident without following 
all of the legal formalities needed to find legal fault. Whatever system is 
relied on to apply punishments, both actual and perceived, can be used to 
influence driver decisions. Deterrence theory (and common sense) dictate 
that the negative approach will be most effective when both actual and 
perceived consequences are presented to the driver. 
An example of the final strategy, decreasing the disutility of not 
eomm~itting an unsafe driving act, might involve the driver who believes 
she will be dismissed because of reporting late to work and who therefore 
attaches a high disutility to complying with the speed limit. Applying this 
strategy, a possible countermeasure might be to persuade the employer to 
find n~eans other than firing tardy workers to encourage their punctuality. 
Applying these four strategies, and relying on risk-management systems 
other than the Traffic Law System alone, we offered a number of 
countermeasures directed a t  the specific unsafe behavior of speeding. 
These included: 
informing drivers that the time savings resulting from 
speeding are small, especially when compared to the 
possible costs of a crash or citation; 
encouraging drivers to report violators to governmental 
authorities or to corporate owners of offending vehicles; 
installing on-board equipment that would inform vehicle 
owners (such as parents or car rental companies) when 
vehicles were operated at high speeds; 
automated speed detection equipment, perhaps coupled with 
a scheme by which vehicle owners rather than drivers are 
penalized for speed offenses; and 
offering rewards to drivers and corporate fleets with 
exemplary records of compliance. 
Other human-oriented countermeasures have been developed by Murdoch 
and Wilde (1980), who used a similar research approach. 
In sum, then, risk management provides a useful set of tools for 
reducing the incidence of unsafe driving actions that cause traffic crashes. 
Our conceptual framework indicates that human-oriented strategies should 
be aimed at  changing driverst assessments of the perceived utilities and 
disutilities associated with a decision to engage in risky behavior. Most 
strategies today focus on increasing the disutility of committing an unsafe 
driving act, typically by imposing legal sanctions on drivers caught 
violating the law. Other strategies are available to change utility and 
disutility perceptions, and systems other than the Traffic Law System can 
be used to do so. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
One of the most striking results of assessing research efforts against 
the conceptual framework presented here is how narrow research has been 
in the field of highway safety. Recommendations of past studies almost 
invariably suggest more research of the same nature and scope. Use of 
the conceptual framework shows that significant areas of the highway 
safety process have received only limited attention. The scope of past 
research has not been adequate. Thus it  is important to broaden the 
scope of inquiry of highway safety research. 
As part of this broadening of scope, consideration must also be given to 
developing a balance. Research has tended to concentrate on the highway 
envirolnment and the vehicle. Only limited research a t  tention has been 
given to the human component of the Highway Transportation System. 
Examination of past funding indicates, a t  a first look, that a relative 
balanlce has been maintained among the components of the Highway 
Transportation System. The funding for human-oriented research, however, 
has been heavily biased toward fldemonstration programsIf such as the 
Alcohol Safety Action Projects sponsored by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) rather than basic research. These programs 
have czonsumed significant funds with insignificant results. They cannot be 
viewed in the same context as past vehicle and highway research efforts. 
Thus, emphasis on human-oriented research should increase. Demonstration 
progralms should follow developmental research projects, not preempt them. 
A comment must be made as well on the quality of research. The 
present research funding process of NHTSA encourages low bidders and 
discourages researchers interested in addressing non-obvious but seminal 
problems, Typically, NHTSA conducts research procurement by competitive 
contract solicitation, Approximately four weeks are allowed from the 
announcement of a procurement, called a Request for Proposal, until the 
due date for the proposal. Some of the procurements have work 
statements that could cover research efforts ranging in magnitude from 
one to one hundred years of professional effort. This produces a bidding 
fljunglew and attracts the segment of the research industry that can afford 
to invest in proposal writing and discourages the research community that 
operates from universities or other non-profit organizations. The result has 
been a lack of continuity in many programs. Work started by one group is 
contirlued by a second. Lessons learned in the first effort must be 
relearned by the second group. Work products of extremely uneven quality 
have been produced and disseminated. If the conclusions fit the policy 
objectives of the moment, the research may be used to support action 
programs or defend past efforts. The relatively small research community 
in highway safety has made i t  difficult to obtain the type of critical 
comment that is common in broader research areas. Individuals are 
reluctant to openly criticize the NHTSA program and the work products of 
their colleagues because of the perceived consequences. It is very 
important for the future of highway safety research that quality control 
methods be developed and implemented. 
Another area of concern is research sponsorship. Initial examination 
indicates that the vast majority of human-oriented highway safety research 
is sponsored by governments. At least 75 percent of the total funding in 
this area comes from federal sources. Private sector funding represents 
only a small portion of the whole--probably about ten percent. It is 
important to review present funding levels, When all factors are  
considered, the expenditure of additional funds for research in highway 
safety is justified and necessary. This suggests increased expenditures by 
both the public and private sectors. 
The respective research roles of the public and private sectors should 
be examined. It is likely that under both present and future funding 
patterns the vast majority of research will be funded by the federal 
government. It then becomes very important to ensure that the policy 
issues of scope, balance, and quality are adequately addressed within the 
federal program, 
This suggests that an important role for the private sector is to help 
ensure that these objectives are met. The private sector can be far more 
influential and eff ec tive by funding efforts to produce better quality 
federal research, The private sector should place greater emphasis on 
funding basic and applied research to develop policy directions for general 
highway safety research and on funding the evaluation of federal research 
programs to ensure that proper attention is given to scope, balance, and 
quality. 
We suggest a series of general strategies for research that address the 
needs of better description of the highway safety process, improved 
decisj.on-making within the process, and improved communication within the 
process, General research strategies include: 
I, Develop an organized body of highway safety theory. Such 
a framework will help organize existing knowledge, establish rules 
for decision-making, focus inquiry, provide a common way to 
communicate, and provide order and direction for risk-reduc t ion 
actions. 
I, Broaden the scope of highway safety research to include all 
aspects of the highway safetg process. It is necessary to 
address the fu l l  breadth of the highway safety process and 
consider all factors that create risk within the Highway 
Transportation System. Present research is too narrow and 
ignores significant areas, such as the role of societal perceptions 
of risk. 
I, Broaden the nature of research activity to include all 
research relevant to reducing the crash risk. An  examination 
of past highway safety research reveals that very little basic or 
applied research related to human-oriented highway safety is 
being conducted. 
I, Balance highway safety research to give attention to all 
priority areas of the highway safety process. Human factors, 
despite having been identified as the major cause of crashes, 
have not been given the same attention as highway- and vehicle- 
oriented research emphasizing the crash phase. Highway crash 
countermeasures likewise stress the highway and vehicle. 
Human-oriented research should determine why people drive 
safely, or what utility drivers associate with committing unsafe 
driving acts. Alternatives to present negative approaches 
directed at the driver should be examined. 
a Make deliberate efforts to increase the quality of highway 
safetg research. A more flexible approach by sponsors, 
especially the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
would lead to research designs that do not unnecessarily hamper 
the quality of highway safety research. 
I, Make deliberate efforts to increase the usefulness and 
actual use of research findings. Program decisions are often 
made without using available information, in part because it is 
difficult to gain access to past research that is not made widely 
available or is poorly indexed and stored. 
I, Increase the level of effort devoted to highway safety 
research. The losses due to highway crashes constitute a 
significant public health problem comparable to that presented by 
diseases to which large-scale efforts are directed. Efforts should 
be concentrated on increasing understanding of what produces 
crashes, increasing the use of technology to reduce crashes, and 
promoting public understanding of the magnitude of the highway 
crash problem, 
It is not only important that priority areas and strategies in the 
highway safety field be addressed, but that the research proceed in a 
logical and organized fashion. Joscelyn and Jones (1 978) presented four 
major program areas paralleling their conceptual approach to highway 
safety. These areas include the highway safety process in general as well 
as its respective elements: the Highway Transportation System, society, 
and risk-management systems. Within each of these program areas there 
are the specific topic areas, identified earlier in this paper, of description, 
decision-making, and communication, plus risk management as a whole. 
Thus a structured program of highway safety research might follow a four- 
by-four matrix. Specific projects addressing these sixteen research 
programs need to be systematically developed. Also, the programs 
themselves should be defined in more detail in a more in-depth program of 
"research on research.?! Finally, a set of priorities should be developed for 
specifyiig which programs and projects should be conducted, in what order, 
and in which time periods. Joscelyn and Jones (1978) made initial 
observations and insights about research priorities and related issues. 
Regarding priorities, the preceding discussion in this paper suggests three 
broad priority areas of near-term research in the field of highway safety: 
perception of risk and risk management; information utilization and 
technology transfer; and development of new risk-management approaches. 
The first of these, perception of risk and risk management, is 
important because subjective perceptions about traffic crash risks and the 
value of risk-management appraches form both the basic constraints on, 
and the sustaining forces for, the highway safety process. How these 
perceptions are formed, how they change, and what factors influence 
perceptions are basically unknown. Until more objective perceptions can 
be developed, the highway safety process will likely follow the direction 
suggested by the most persuasive voice. 
The second area, information utilization and technology transfer, is 
significant because studies have shown that the use of existing knowledge 
and technology in the field of highway safety is relatively low. This is 
particularly true a t  the local government level. The ways in which 
inforrr~ation is transmitted and used are now well known. The individuals 
who should be using research findings are not adequately identified. 
Methods for disseminating information, well known within the fields of 
education and communication science, have been applied only to a limited 
degree in highway safety. As critical as it is to expand the existing 
knowledge base, it is equally critical that existing, valid knowledge is used. 
Thle third area, developing new risk-management approaches, flows 
from the observation that conventional risk-management systems, especially 
the Tlraffic Law System, are heavily relied on to manage the traffic crash 
risk. Existing risk-management approaches are primarily negative in 
nature!, relying on the substitution of a present threat, such as a traffic 
arrest, for the more indefinite risk of a traffic crash. Consideration needs 
to be given to more positive approaches, such as reducing the benefits 
associlated with risk-taking. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
This paper has detailed the magnitude of the traffic crash risk, and has 
examined existing conceptual frameworks in the field of highway safety. 
It has described and illustrated a new conceptual framework, based upon 
this analysis and on a reexamination of the goals of the highway safety 
process. 
The highway safety process is oriented to the control or management of 
risk. Therefore, conceptualization has involved describing the systems 
involved in this process. Prescriptively, the problem has been defined as 
one of improving the systemb capacity to control risk, a problem that was 
pursued in the specific context of the formal organization of the risk- 
management system. This led to an examination of the critical role of 
knowledge and information, and the use of risk-management principles. 
This paper raised and discussed highway safety issues, reached 
conclusions and made recommendations related to those issues. When used 
to examine past and current problems in highway safety, the conceptual 
framework was found to be useful in identifying research questions that 
need to be pursued. Nonetheless, this paper should be viewed primarily as 
a policy study. What follows is a limited set of top-level conclusions and 
accompanying recommendations that the authors believe are most important 
for immediate consideration. 
Immediate emphasis should be placed upon in-depth 
consideration of the goals of highway safety. The goals of 
highway safety are only valuely defined, and are not based upon a 
thorough analysis of highway safety processes. 
It is theref ore recommended that well-defined mechanisms for 
the intensive analysis of goals be instituted. Not only should goal 
determination processes be encouraged a t  every level of risk 
management, but systemwide goal determination processes, 
emphasizing broad participation, should be undertaken. 
A better specification and articulation of knowledge, 
information and action objectives is needed. The goals of 
highway safety are frequently stated in terms of action objectives. 
What knowledge and information are required is seldom specified as 
an explicit objective and articulated with a particular program of 
action objectives. Effective action on complex safety problems 
requires effective generation and use of knowledge; therefore, an 
action system not only requires action objectives, but an articulated 
set of knowledge and information objectives. 
It is therefore recommended that major action objectives be 
thoroughly examined with respect to the implied knowledge and 
information requirements, and the necessary support-resources, time 
and willingness to create developmental and experimental exceptions 
to standard practices-must be provided. 
Immediate emphasis should be placed on developing an 
organized body of theory of highway safety. The lack of order, 
conflicting demands for resources, and absence of an organizing 
framework for decision-making evidence the need for a general 
theory and model. The conceptual framework presented here is a 
starting point, but much more must be done. 
It is therefore recommended that formal programs, designed to 
develop theory, be started by the public and private institutions 
concerned with highway safety. Cooperation should be encouraged, 
but it is likely that the field will benefit from multiple as opposed 
to monolithic programs. The research community should lead in 
encouraging the s tar t  of a research program and in critically 
reviewing its progress. 
Priority should be given to improving the use of existing 
knowledge about the traffic crash risk and methods for 
managing that risk. Available evidence indicates that societal 
peceptions of the traffic crash risk are inaccurate. Traffic crashes 
appear to be viewed as less important than other societal risks that 
produce less loss. A more ahcurate perception of risk is likely to 
resul t  in risk reduction and improvement of risk-management 
operat ions. 
It is therefore recommended that formal programs be established 
at  the federal, state, and local level to disseminate information on 
risk and risk management to decision-makers. It is not enough to 
simply transmit information; it must be transmitted in forms that 
help to assure that it is understood and thus applied to reduce risk. 
Emphasis should be placed on understanding the role that 
human factors play in crash causation and crash losses. 
Risk-management strategies that effectively deal with these 
factors should receive priority attention. Available information 
on the traffic crash risk indicates t h a t  human fac to r s  a r e  
predominant in traffic crash causation. These factors have received 
only limited attention in the last ten years-in the sense of rigorous 
systematic examination of risk, and development of risk-management 
responses. 
Further identification of "humanf1 risk may well result in risk- 
management strategies that focus on changes in the vehicle or 
highway environment or both. 
It is therefore recommended that the responsible federal agency 
allocate significant resources for research on risk identification and 
development of risk-management strategies focused on the human 
factor. Funding efforts to establish a base for effective action 
should take priority over funding conventional demonstration 
programs. 
The general concept of highway safety should be broadened 
and more disciplines encouraged to study problems of crashes 
and crash losses. The conceptual framework identified many new 
areas that must be described and studied to elucidate the highway 
safety process. This inquiry should involve individuals from 
disciplines other than those traditionally involved in highway safety 
research or programs, such as decision theorists and social 
psychologists. 
It is therefore recommended that public and private institutions 
establish and fund programs designed to apply the best minds from a 
wide range of disciplines to an examination of crash risk and its 
reduction. In turn, the research and academic community should 
formally recognize, to a greater extent, the importance of managing 
the traffic crash risk. Understanding how the traffic' crash risk is 
created,  and how it  can be managed, can lead to a broader 
understanding of how to manage risk in society. 
This paper has been written to raise issues and stimulate discussion, and 
not necessarily to resolve questions or prescribe solutions. It is hoped that 
this work will contribute to some short-term solutions. More important, it 
is hoped that this will lead to development of a more vigorous conceptual 
framework that, in turn, will permit development of more effective ways 
of managing the risk of traffic crashes. 
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